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SUMMARY
This document provides current and future program organizations
with a broad source of safety-related design criteria and suggests
methods for systematic and progressive application of the criteria be-
ginning with preliminary development of design requirements and speci-
fications.
INTRODUCTION
This document has been prepared to introduce potential users to
a system safety experience retention concept which was formalized on
the Skylab Program through the means of system safety (design criteria)
checklists. The document contains a composite of four design series
checklists that were issued for Skylab and reflects updated criteria
based on implementation of the Skylab System Safety Checklist Program.
The criteria have been prepared and organized for application on any
space program. The document contains over 500 design criteria state-
ments which are applicable to a variety of flight systems, experiments
and other payloads, and associated ground support equipment and facility
support systems. All of the suggested criteria are not applicable to
all space activities, if for no other reason than the fact that Skylab
involved manned flight. However, the consideration of criteria that
may be too stringent in some applications may provide helpful stimulus
to the design thought process.
The checklist will not be fully exploited unless it is used at
the working design level during the earliest phases of development.
It can be effectively used at more mature stages of product develop-
ment for purposes such as support to analytical efforts, as inspection
criteria, and to aid in identifying potential hazards during the re-
view of design changes, but obviously with less opportunity for influ-
encing the design with minimal cost or schedule impact.
Recognizing the user's obligation to shape the checklist to his
particular needs, a summary of the background, rationale, objectives,
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development and implementation approach, and benefits based on Skylab
experience has been included.
HI STORICAL BACKGROUND
Handbooks, guideline documents, hazard catalogs, and accident-
incident summaries which have been developed over the past ten to
fifteen years are valuable indicators of past performance. However,
according to a review of accident and incident experience from a wide
variety of aerospace sources during the Skylab Program, it was clearly
indicated that certain types of hazards have resulted in unsafe failures,
accidents, and incidents again and again in each new program.
The cumulative effects of new technology creates a significant
number of new hazards that must be identified and controlled. However,
experience has shown that the application of new technology to the de-
velopment of each new product represents only a small part of the safety
problem. The majority of system safety deficiencies and resultant acci-
dents or incidents are largely related to design and operational con-
ditions in areas where we have ten or more years experience. During
Skylab, even with increased emphasis on the performance of Failure Mode
and Effect Analyses (FMEA), System Logic Analysis, Sneak Circuit Analy-
sis and many other forms of hazard analysis, a remaining management
concern existed in the area of recurrence control of proven accident
causes. Thus, an improved technique for the effective application of
safety-related experience from previous programs was sought.
Some of the factors considered during initial studies to develop
such a technique, which were also based on prior program experiences,
are as follows:
1. Corrective action implies that something was not done prop-
erly the first time. Finding this out after the accident or failure
occurs can be far more costly than the early identification of condi-
tions which can lead to unsafe failures, equipment damage or personnel
injury and correct them before they cause losses or casualties. Fur-
thermore, the earlier in time that hazardous conditions are identified,
the less they will cost to eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level.
The factors of cost and schedule have a greater influence on decisions
once designs are released and manufacturing and testing have started.
This results in the tendency to apply procedural controls or rely on
individual knowledge or awareness to control potential hazards in order
to minimize design changes.
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2. The responsibility for hazard identification and control has
historically been inherent in the role of design engineering, reliabil-
ity, quality assurance, and other disciplines. Nevertheless, there has
been a limited understanding of the system safety aspects of a program
by the various engineering, production, and operations personnel at all
organizational levels throughout the industry.
3. Cost constraints have limited the development of large safety
organizations at the individual program level. Further, assigned safety
personnel have had limited multidiscipline experience.
4. There has been a recognized limitation of safety personnel
to influence product design. Some of the contributing factors identi-
fied were: late assignment to a program, late completion of hazard
analyses for designs reaching a production phase, and a limited number
of safety personnel in combination with safety engineering time spent
in developing plans, procedures, and techniques required to implement
specified program level safety requirements.
Because such factors, either singly or in combination, have
varied with programs, contractors, and contracting organizations no
universal solution was apparent. However, the need for a technique
to increase the effectiveness of existing safety personnel through all
organizations responsible for product development was evident. It was
also recognized that to be effective such a technique would have to be
relatively simple and compatible with established policies, procedures,
and practices of many disciplines within a wide variety of product de-
velopment organizations.
A. Basic Objectives
The basic objectives of the techniques developed for Skylab were:
1. Determine the actual status of Skylab design features or
operational conditions that could result in systems failure, equipment
damage, or personnel injury.
2. Establish a systematic hazard identification and assessment
program to supplement existing analytical efforts such as FMEA's, sneak
circuit analysis, hazard analyses, etc.
3. Establish an approach to assess existing Skylab designs and
operational conditions, using a broad combination of the retained safety-
related experience from the aerospace industry as criteria.
4. Provide a method to ensure effective implementation and visi-
bility to management of results.
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According to the previously mentioned reviews of accident and
incident experiences, inadequacy of overpressure relief protection has
historically been a factor in equipment loss or damage. Although relief
devices have been installed to protect against overpressurization from
such causes as regulator failure or human error, they have in many cases
failed to do so. They have been found to be undersized with respect to
the maximum flow capacity of an upstream failed-open regulator, improp-
erly set with respect to protection for the end product being pressur-
ized, and inhibited by caps, plugs, or valves. This single condition
(improper sizing of relief devices) is an example of many conditions
that were of concern to Skylab management.
Initially, techniques to improve analytical methods for hazard
identification were considered. Cost, limited numbers and experience
of analysts, complexity of techniques, differences in established
management practices within government agencies and contractor organi-
zations, and the most important factor of time would not permit devel-
opment and implementation of additional analytical methods. It was
recognized, however, that a logical tool that could be applied to all
existing analytical methods to assist in the identification of hazards
is a checklist-specifically, a checklist based on tests, field opera-
ting experience, and accident history. From this basic thought and-in
recognition of the first three stated objectives the Skylab System
Safety Checklist Program evolved.
It was recognized that safety program performance based on con-
ventional indicators such as accident frequency, severity, or lost
time would not be sufficient to the achievement of the fourth objective.
The primary concern on Skylab was accident prevention with emphasis
on recurrence control. Therefore, it was decided that a method to
determine effectiveness would be based on potential hazards identified
and actions taken to eliminate or control known accident or incident
causes.
B. Checklist Development and Implementation Approac'h
At the time of initial development of the Skylab checklist con-
cept the Skylab Program was in the later stages of development. For
this reason, a more progressive total program concept was modified for
Skylab application. A safety review of the entire Skylab Cluster and
an assessment of the adequacy of protection for flight systems from
ground support equipment (GSE) was to be performed as part of a Systems/
Operations Compatibility Review preparatory to the Design Certification
Review (DCR).
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Four system safety checklists were developed using a broad com-
bination of documents such as those shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Typical Source Data for Checklist Development
SKyLAB SYSTEM SAFETY CHECKLIST PROGRAM
MANNED SPACE PROGRAMS ACCIDENT/INCIDENT SUMMARIES NASA, DIR OF SAFETY, MARCH 1970
SYSTEM SAFETY ACCIDENT/INCIDENT SUMMARY NAR, SPACE DIV. JULY 1967
AIR FORCE EASTERN TEST RANGE SAFETY MANUAL, VOL. I AFETRM 127-1, JANUARY 1, 1969
MINUTES, SYSTEM SAFETY NETWORK TECHNICAL
INTERCHANGE MEETINGS
SPACE FLIGHT HAZARDS CATALOG MSC 00134, REV. A. JANUARY 1970
MANAGEMENT MANUAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION BULLETINS MSC-M8081. JANUARY 1970
SPACE FLIGHT HARDWARE ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE REPORT MSFC. OCTOBER 14, 1966
APOLLO 14 SAFETY ASSESSMENT MSC-SN-1-174-10. DECEMBER 2, 1970
AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND DESIGN HANDBOOK, DH 1-6. JULY 20, 1968
SERIES 1-0 REV. JULY 20, 1970
REPORT OF APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD...ALL APPENDICES APRIL 5, 1967
REPORT OF APOLLO 13 REVIEW BOARD...ALL APPENDICES JUNE 16, 1970
MANNED SPACECRAFT CRITERIA AND STANDARDS MSCM 8080, APRIL 26, 1971
The approach selected for checklist development was to convert
accident and incident data into positive design criteria statements
which were specifically tailored to assess the hardware systems and
equipment indicated by the following general titles:
1. Ground Support Equipment Design (SA-003-001-2H, July 1971).
2. Flight Systems Design (SA-003-002-2H, November 1971).
3. Experiment Systems Design (SA-003-003-2H, November 1971).
4. Experiment Ground Support Equipment Design (SA-003-004-2H,
November 1971).
The approach selected for checklist implementation was to allow
Skylab design organizations to assess that hardware for which they were
responsible at the time the checklist was issued. This approach per-
mitted the most rapid and accurate safety assessment of the Skylab
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hardware by using the personnel most knowledgeable of the design details
-the design engineers. In addition, a system for receipt, review,
evaluation, follow-up with design organizations, statusing, and tracking
of potential problems and actions taken was developed concurrently with
checklist development and issuance.
Each Skylab system safety checklist document was issued with
separate instructions for completion. The checklists were issued by
MSFC, Skylab Program management ". . . to provide an independent assess-
ment of Skylab hardware, to be doubly sure that crew safety and the
accomplishment of primary mission objectives will not be compromised.
The principle of 'experience retention' has been applied to the devel-
opment of the checklists, which are based on the safety-related experi-
ences from many sources in the aerospace community, in both industry
and Government."
The checklist format, as shown in Figure 1, with sample criteria
statements applicable to GSE design, was unique in both the manner in
which it was written and the manner in which it was intended to be used.
The intent was to provide actual status of design features. Therefore,
such common terms as "critical," "high pressure," "low pressure," "high
voltage," and "shall be avoided" were not used. Words of this type
could have led to ambiguity and might have been subject to differences
of opinion. The format was designed to accommodate a specific procedure
for completion and standardized processing of the checklists at MSFC.
The procedure was developed to attain the stated checklist program ob-
jectives. The basic procedure for completion and return is outlined as
follows:
1. Checklists were intended for use by each design element having
responsibility for an end item or subsystem.
2. Columns were to be marked based on actual conditions of de-
sign, regardless of what may have been required in the design specifi-
cation.
3. "Noncompliance" or "Not Applicable" responses required a
statement on a supplemental status form describing and justifying the
existing conditions, or describing the alternate method by which the
intent of the stated criterion had been met. The checklist statements
were meant to be taken literally, i.e., compliance with the intent was
not cause for marking.the compliance column.
4. Completed checklists were to be signed and returned to the
issuing organization for review, evaluation and statusing.
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SYSTEM SAFETY CHECKLIST
TITLE: W W W
Z Z .
W SECTION/TITLE: 5 4 4
MI DATE: ORGANIZATION: a. 0. L J
SYSTEM/SUBSYSTEM: 0o Z 4
* Adjacent or incompatible system connectors or flanged
connections shall be keyed or sized so it is physi-
cally impossible to connect an incompatible pressure
unit, comm odity or pressure level.
SIPressure relief valves and relief vent lines shall
be sized to exceed the maximum flow capacity of the
upstream pressure regulating device.
* Shutoff valves shall not be installed in series with
relief valves unless a burst disc or other positive
relief device is installed in parallel.
* All adjacent connectors shall be shaped or restrained
so that they are physically impossible to mismate.
* Connectors with unkeyed symmetrical pin arrangements
shall not be used.
* Overload protection devices shall be sized (or set)
so that the combination of current and time at which
the device operates will not cause the operation of
upstream protective devices.
Figure 1: TYPICAL FORMAT AND SAMPLE CRITERIA -
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT DESIGN
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C. Ground Rules for Checklist Program Implementation
Ground rules for contractual action control, approval cycles,
release procedures, tracking of problem-action summaries, etc., were
as follows:
1. Checklists would neither impose requirements on the designs
nor, in themselves, authorize or recommend design changes.
2. Checklists would be released by appropriate MSFC project
offices.
3. Upon receipt of returned checklists by project offices,
copies would be submitted to the Skylab Test, Reliability, Quality
Assurance and Safety Office (SL-TQ) for review, evaluation, and status-
ing.
4. Processing by SL-TQ would include the preparation of problem-
action summaries which would be submitted to appropriate management for
further investigation or corrective action. A special task team was
established by the Skylab Program Office to assist in uniform problem
verification, follow-up with design organizations, and to recommend or
initiate corrective actions as appropriate.
5. Problem-action summaries would be tracked until closed by
MSFC or contractor action. In other words, tracked until a design
change was approved and incorporated or the disposition and rationale
for risk acceptance was approved by program management.
6. Constraint inputs to plans, procedures, and operations
(flight and ground, to include tests, handling, transportation and
storage) would be developed based on hazards identified and residual
risks which management deemed acceptable.
D. Benefits of Checklist Technique
This self-assessment checklist technique and the broad-based
systematic application of checklists, in combination with the evaluation
and corrective action system, resulted in the following:
1. Demonstration that if experience retention information is
brought to the attention of the designer in a direct manner, he will
apply it. Oversights in new designs and in converting equipment from
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previous programs to new uses on Skylab were identified and corrected.
Many of these actions were initiated by the responsible design groups
during checklist completion prior to checklist return to MSFC. "Non-
compliance" columns were marked and the actions that were in process
to correct deficiencies were stated in the supplemental rationale.
2. Provided a method for coordinating the efforts of many gov-
ernment and contractor organizations from a systems safety point of
view. Detailed reviews of management controls, processes, and opera-
ting procedures resulted from questions brought out by evaluation
efforts. These reviews considered such factors as controls to prevent
installation of components in reverse, controls to ensure application
of proper torque values, verification of pressure regulator and flow
control device settings, verification of cleanliness levels of GSE
prior to use with flight hardware, and inspection of connectors for
bent pins, foreign objects, or contamination prior to mating.
3. Extended the capability of a small group of system safety
specialists to permit a program-wide safety assessment through engi-
neering organizations responsible for hardware development. Names and
department numbers of individual engineers who had completed each
checklist section were submitted to MSFC with each checklist. Rapid
response was provided by telephone to questions arising during the
evaluation process. Copies of detailed drawings or procedures were
submitted upon request as required to process potential problem-action
summaries. The use of existing design groups minimized the develop-
ment and continuous maintenance (changes) of detail design schematics
at the component, subassembly, or subsystem level by the system safety
evaluation group. Design changes occurring after initial checklist
submittal were reviewed against checklist criteria by the design group
responsible for the change. Supplemental status sheets were submitted
to the safety evaluation group for changed items. This supplemental
status was reviewed for impact against previously baselined safety
checklist status for the equipment.
4. Provided management with visibility of results. Centralized
processing of completed checklists and a coordinated corrective action
system provided a focal point for overall checklist program status.
Comparisons.between checklists for flight and ground equipment used in
combination resulted in the identification and resolution of potential
hazards not recognized at the individual equipment level. Significant
risks were immediately brought to the attention of the responsible de-
sign organization for confirmation and corrective action recommenda-
tions. Potential problems were resolved through Configuration Change
(Review) Board action. Skylab system safety checklist program status
reviews were included as part of periodic MSFC Skylab Program Manage-
ment Reviews. In addition, checklist status was included as a special
subject within Reliability and Safety portions of the DCR, both at the
individual prime contractor level and at the overall Skylab level.
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E. Conclusions Based on Skylab Experience
The basic concept for progressive total program application of
system safety checklists can be effectively implemented on any program,
subsystem, or product of any size of complexity. A master set of check-
lists can be developed from this initial baseline document and from which
applicable sections or criteria statements can be selected to fit a given
discipline, product, or program. This approach would minimize continual
redevelopment efforts on each program or for each product. However, the
need to select and tailor the criteria to the specific product, opera-
tion, or program is essential to the achievement of the stated objectives.
In addition to the benefits previously described, the disciplined
approach provided by this checklist technique will provide the following:
1. Assists all disciplines in the application of safety-related
experience.
2. Provides educational benefits to all disciplines and helps
to prevent oversights by bringing attention to many of the conditions
which have contributed to accidents, incidents, or failures in the past.
3. Provides a systematic method to identify hazards which can be
used independently or in support of more sophisticated hazard analysis
methods.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAM APPLICATION
The composite system safety checklist (parts I and II contained
herein) can be applied by the following methods.
1. Direct incorporation of criteria statements into design spe-
cifications. This approach would provide visibility of "noncompliance"
items and alternate methods by which the intent has been met through a
standard configuration management process (e.g., waiver or deviation
requests and subsequent risk decisions).
2. The addition of two additional columns on a form similar to
that used on Skylab (see Figure 1) could be used for programs in the
very early phases of development (i.e., prior to the Preliminary Re-
quirements Review or Preliminary Design Review). The additional columns
could be used for "Design Will Comply" and "Design Will Not Comply."
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In cases where the "Noncompliance" column is marked in addition to
"Design Will Comply," no supplemental rationale would be required. At
such time as the design is changed to meet the criteria, the status
would be changed. If no additional visibility is provided during
periods between milestone reviews or preferably a lesser but reasonable
period of time, the item being tracked could be investigated further.
3. The approach used on Skylab could be effectively implemented
for program phases such as during detail design prior to the Critical
Design Review or Design Certification Review.
4. The checklist technique described could also be used as a
supplement to the review of all design changes. Overall system safety
status could then be maintained throughout the program. This status
could be reviewed as part of major milestone reviews and provide a con-
tinuous source of information for the progressive development of hazard
summaries or catalogs. This information could also become input data
to (or be combined with) a critical items list. Thus, increased confi-
dence could be obtained in the late phases of a program, such as during
a Design Certification Review or Flight Readiness Review, as to the
residual risks associated with the product and its intended use.
Recognizing the users obligation to shape the checklist appli-
cation technique to his particular needs, it is important to note that
a criteria statement marked "noncompliance" would not in all cases indi-
cate a hazardous condition. Alternate methods within the design may
accomplish the same intent. The evaluation of completed checklists for
independent hardware end items should consider equipment used in com-
bination to accomplish a specific operation. Interfacing systems or
equipment may complement each other or create systems-level hazards.
The visibility afforded by completed checklists could allow these deter-
minations to be made. The evaluation of criteria statements in combina-
tion within a single checklist could be used to produce a safety profile
of the product or equipment being assessed. Similarly, the evaluation
of multiple checklists for equipment used in combination to accomplish
a test or similar function can be used to produce a system safety pro-file.
Amplifying a previous example, a pressurization console may not
incorporate built-in relief protection but the interfacing system in an
upstream facility may provide adequate console protection. A flight
pressure vessel which is to become a component part of a larger system,
on the other hand, may not have built-in relief protection and may be
vulnerable to loss during component level test. Multipurpose test
facilities and consoles may incorporate adequate self-protection as a
system but may not protect the equipment under test. This can happen
where various organizations or contractors are involved in designing
equipment and subsystems. System safety checklists can be used as an
aid in assessing the safety aspects of an integrated system for all
planned operational configurations.
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SYSTEM SAFETY CHECKLIST - PART I
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SECTION: 1.0 SYSTEMS CRITERIA
1.1 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS
1. DC RETURNS SHALL NOT BE DISCONNECTED OR ISOLATED FROM THE SINGLE
POINT GROUND CONNECTION TO THE SPACECRAFT STRUCTURE DURING ANY
MODE OF SYSTEM, EXPERIMENT OR OTHER PAYLOAD OPERATION.
2. MODULE, EXPERIMENT AND OTHER PAYLOAD MATING SURFACES SHALL BE
ELECTRICALLY BONDED SO THAT A FAULT CURRENT (BASED ON MAXIMUM
SHORT CIRCUIT CURRENT THAT MAY RESULT FROM AVAILABLE POWER WITH-
IN INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT) MAY BE SAFELY RETURNED FROM ANY POINT
ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODULE, EXPERIMENT OR OTHER PAYLOAD TO
THE SPACECRAFT SINGLE POINT GROUND.
3. THE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM SHALL INCLUDE THE CAPABILITY TO
ISOLATE EACH LOAD INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE POWER SOURCE TO PERMIT
LOAD SELECTION DURING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.
4. REDUNDANT POWER DISTRIBUTION BUSES SHALL NOT BE ROUTED THROUGH
THE SAME CONNECTOR.
1.2 ENVIRONMENTAL AND THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
5. MEANS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR THE CREW AND BY GROUND COMMAND TO
OVERRIDE THE AUTOMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM.
6. MEANS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR THE CREW AND BY GROUND COMMAND TO
OVERRIDE THE AUTOMATIC ACTIVE THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM.
7. REDUNDANT OXYGEN AND COOLANT WATER SUPPLY CONNECTIONS SHALL BE
PROVIDED AT EVA STATIONS.
8. THE OXYGEN SYSTEM SHALL HAVE REDUNDANT LINES AND ISOLATION
VALVES TO CONNECT OXYGEN STORAGE BOTTLES TO THE OXYGEN PRESSURE
REGULATION SUBSYSTEM (COMPONENTS) TO ENSURE THAT A LEAK IN A
SINGLE OXYGEN LINE WOULD NOT RESULT IN A LOSS OF THE TOTAL
OXYGEN SUPPLY.
9. THE NITROGEN SYSTEM SHALL HAVE REDUNDANT LINES AND ISOLATION
VALVES TO CONNECT NITROGEN STORAGE BOTTLES TO THE NITROGEN PRES-
SURE REGULATION SUBSYSTEM (COMPONENTS) TO ENSURE THAT A LEAK IN
A SINGLE NITROGEN LINE WOULD NOT RESULT IN A LOSS OF THE TOTAL
NITROGEN SUPPLY.
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FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND EXPERIMENT HARDWARE DESIGN
SECTION: 1.0 SYSTEMS CRITERIA
10. THE SPACECRAFT HABITABLE ENVIRONMENT (E.G., CABIN, LABORATORY,
ETC.) VENTING SYSTEM SHALL NOT VENT THROUGH OUTLETS THAT ARE
USED TO VENT OTHER LIQUIDS OR GASES.
11. THE SPACECRAFT HABITABLE ENVIRONMENT RELIEF VALVE(S) AND OTHER
VENTING DEVICES SHALL PROVIDE AN AUDIBLE AND VISUAL INDICATION
WHEN NOT FULLY SEATED.
12. DEVICES WITH REPLACEABLE OR CLEANABLE ELEMENTS SHALL BE PRO-
VIDED TO REMOVE PARTICULATE MATTER FROM THE HABITABLE
ENVIRONMENT.
1.3 CAUTION AND WARNING (C&W) TYPE SYSTEMS
(E.G., HAZARD OR EMERGENCY DETECTION SYSTEMS)
13. EACH PARAMETER MONITORED BY THE CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM SHALL
BE TELEMETERED TO THE GROUND UPON SENSING AN OUT-OF-TOLERANCE
CONDITION.
14. ALL C&W SYSTEM SENSORS SHALL FAIL IN SUCH A MANNER THAT A SIGNAL
INPUT WILL BE INITIATED TO THE C&W SYSTEM, RESULTING' IN AN ALARM.
15. ALL SENSORS FOR ALL PARAMETERS MONITORED BY THE C&W SYSTEM SHALL
BE INDEPENDENTLY POWERED BY THE C&W SYSTEM TO PREVENT LOSS OF
HAZARD INDICATION DUE TO POWER FAILURE OF A MONITORED SYSTEM.
16. END-TO-END IN-FLIGHT CHECKOUT CAPABILITY SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR
EACH SUBSYSTEM SECTION OF THE C&W SYSTEM INCLUDING THE CAPA-
BILITY TO TEST EACH SENSOR OPERATION.
17. THE C&W SYSTEM SHALL MONITOR ITS OWN PERFORMANCE AND ALERT THE
CREW TO OUT-OF-LIMIT CONDITIONS, INCLUDING LOSS OF PRIMARY
POWER.
18. THE C&W SYSTEM AUDIO TONES SHALL NOT BE ROUTED TO EVA CREWMEN,
IF A CREW MEMBER IS ON WATCH INSIDE THE SPACECRAFT.
19. ALL C&W SYSTEM AUDIO TONE (LEVEL) CONTROLS SHALL BE DESIGNED
SUCH THAT THE TONE IS STILL AUDIBLE AT THE MINIMUM CONTROL
SETTING.
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1.3 CAUTION AND WARNING (C&W) TYPE SYSTEMS (Cont.)
20. THE OPERATION OF ANY SWITCH THAT WOULD DISABLE AN EMERGENCY OR
WARNING SUBSYSTEM TONE GENERATOR OR SPEAKER BOX(ES) SHALL GEN-
ERATE A TELEMETRY SIGNAL TO THE GROUND IN ORDER TO PROTECT
AGAINST INADVERTENT OPERATION OR FAILURE OF THE SWITCH FROM
DEGRADING THE C&W SYSTEM CAPABILITY TO SOUND AN AUDIBLE ALARM.
21. AN INHIBIT SWITCH SHALL BE PROVIDED IN EACH SENSOR CIRCUIT TO
ALLOW ISOLATION OF A SINGLE MALFUNCTIONING SENSOR AND PERMIT
NORMAL OPERATION OF ALL OTHER REMAINING SENSING UNITS.
22. THE CAPABILITY SHALL BE PROVIDED TO TRANSMIT A "CREW ALERT" FROM
A GROUND COMMAND IN ORDER TO INITIATE A WARNING THROUGH THE C&W
SYSTEM.
23. ALL SENSORS USED FOR INPUTS TO SYSTEMS OTHER THAN C&W, WHICH ARE
ALSO USED BY THE C&W SYSTEM, SHALL BE ISOLATED SUCH THAT A
FAILURE IN THE OTHER SYSTEM WILL NOT AFFECT THE CAUTION AND
WARNING SYSTEM.
24. FIRE SENSORS (DETECTORS) SHALL BE LOCATED TO PROVIDE COVERAGE OF
ALL HABITABLE AREAS OF THE SPACECRAFT.
1.4 ATTITUDE AND POINTING CONTROL TYPE SYSTEMS (APCS)
(E.G., GUIDANCE, NAVIGATION, FLIGHT CONTROLS)
25. GYROSCOPE INSTALLATIONS USED FOR GUIDANCE, STABILIZATION AND
CONTROL OR SIMILAR APPLICATIONS SHALL INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR
VERIFICATION BY GROUND CONTROL AND THE FLIGHT CREW THAT GYRO
ROTATIONAL SPEED IS WITHIN LIMITS.
26. ALL ATTITUDE AND POINTING CONTROL GYROS SHALL ACTUATE ALARMS
WHEN THE GYROS ARE IN OPERATIONAL USE BUT NOT OPERATING WITHIN
THE SPECIFIED RANGE OF ROTATIONAL SPEED.
1.4.1 THRUSTER TYPE ATTITUDE CONTROL SYSTEMS (ACS)
27. THE ACS SHALL BE CAPABLE OF ISOLATING OR INTERRUPTING THE COM-
MAND TO EACH THRUSTER CONTROL VALVE IN ORDER TO PROTECT AGAINST
INADVERTENT COMMANDS OR A STUCK OPEN THRUSTER.
28. AN INTERLOCK SHALL BE PROVIDED TO PRECLUDE OPERATION OF THE ACS
THRUSTERS DURING EVA.
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1.4.1 THRUSTER TYPE ATTITUDE CONTROL SYSTEMS (ACS)
29. THERE SHALL BE GROUND COMMAND CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT THE IMPULSE
OF THE ACS THRUSTERS.
1.5 CREW ACCOMMODATIONS
30. A SELF-CONTAINED, PORTABLE BREATHING OXYGEN SYSTEM SHALL BE PRO-
VIDED FOR EACH ASTRONAUT FOR USE DURING EMERGENCY CONDITIONS.
31. A FIRE EXTINGUISHER(S) SHALL BE PROVIDED IN EACH MODULE AND
CREW COMPARTMENT.
32. CREW ACCOMMODATIONS, INCLUDING SLEEPING ACCOMMODATIONS, SHALL BE
DESIGNED AND LOCATED SUCH THAT INVOLUNTARY MOVEMENTS OF CREWMEN
SHALL NOT ACTUATE EQUIPMENT.
33. EAR PROTECTIVE DEVICES SHALL BE PROVIDED WHICH ARE DESIGNED
SOLELY TO PREVENT INJURY TO THE EAR FROM EXCESSIVE NOISE LEVELS
AND SHALL BE IN ADDITION TO DEVICES WHICH ARE USED FOR ANOTHER
PURPOSE, SUCH AS A COMMUNICATIONS HEADSET.
34. ALL RESTRAINING DEVICES, CABLE OR WIRING HARNESSES AND UMBILI-
CALS WHICH MAY RESTRAIN A HUMAN OPERATOR OR TEST SUBJECT SHALL
INCLUDE QUICK DISCONNECT OR RAPID RELEASE DEVICES TO FREE THE
OPERATOR OR SUBJECT UNDER ADVERSE CONDITIONS.
35. ALL QUICK DISCONNECT OR RAPID RELEASE MECHANISMS USED TO FREE A
HUMAN OPERATOR OR TEST SUBJECT FROM ANY RESTRAINING DEVICE,
CABLE, WIRING HARNESS OR UMBILICAL SHALL AUTOMATICALLY REMOVE
POWER OR RENDER INOPERATIVE ALL EQUIPMENT ACTING UPON OR USED
BY THE TEST SUBJECT OR OPERATOR FOR ALL MODES OF EQUIPMENT
OPERATION.
1.6 EXPERIMENT AND OTHER PAYLOAD HARDWARE ACCOMMODATIONS
1.6.1 GENERAL
36. ROTATIONAL EQUIPMENT WITHIN ENCLOSURES REQUIRING PERIODIC ACCESS,
SUCH AS MOTOR DRIVEN CANISTERS CONTAINING PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT
OR TELESCOPES, SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH A POSITIVE MANUAL LOCKING
DEVICE, ACCESS DOOR INTERLOCK WITH DRIVE MECHANISMS OR SIMILAR
CREW PROTECTION IN ORDER TO PREVENT EQUIPMENT ROTATION DURING
PERIODS REQUIRING CREW ACCESS, SUCH AS DURING FILM RETRIEVAL AND
REPLACEMENT ACTIVITIES.
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1.6.1 GENERAL (Cont.)
37. CAPABILITY SHALL BE PROVIDED TO REMOVE ELECTRICAL POWER FROM
EACH EXPERIMENT INTERFACE WITHOUT AFFECTING THE OPERATION OF
OTHER EXPERIMENTS OR SYSTEMS.
38. VIEWFINDERS AND SIMILAR CREW OPERATED SIGHTING EQUIPMENT SHALL
INCORPORATE FILTERS OR AUTOMATIC APERTURE CONTROLS THAT WILL
LIMIT THE AMOUNT AND TYPE OF LIGHT SEEN BY A CREWMAN.
39. THERE SHALL BE A DISPLAY DEVICE TO INDICATE TO THE CREW THE
OPEN POSITION OF ANY EXTERNAL DOOR OVER A WINDOW IN THE SPACE-
CRAFT STRUCTURE WHICH IS USED BY AN EXPERIMENT AND WHICH MAY BE
OBSTRUCTED FROM VIEW BY THE INSTALLED EXPERIMENT (DIRECT MECHANI-
CAL LINKAGE WITH NO ELECTRICAL INTERFACE PREFERRED).
40. ALL EQUIPMENT USING A SINGLE PANE WINDOW IN THE SPACECRAFT
STRUCTURE SHALL BE SEALED AGAINST THE SPACECRAFT STRUCTURE AND
SHALL BE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING 4.0 TIMES THE DIFFERENTIAL
PRESSURE ACROSS THE SPACECRAFT SHELL IN ORDER TO PROTECT AGAINST
RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE SPACECRAFT IN THE EVENT OF LOSS
OF SPACECRAFT WINDOW INTEGRITY.
1.6.2 MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND EXPERIMENTS
41. ELECTRICAL SHOCK PROTECTION CIRCUITS IN ALL EQUIPMENT INCOR-
PORATING PROBES, SENSORS AND SIMILAR DEVICES THAT ARE ATTACHED
TO A CREWMAN OR TEST SUBJECT SHALL BE DESIGNED TO REMOVE THE
INPUT POWER TO THE EQUIPMENT WHEN A CURRENT LEVEL OF 100 MICRO-
AMPERES IS SENSED.
42. ELECTRICAL SHOCK PROTECTION CIRCUITS SHALL BE TOTALLY REDUNDANT
STO INSURE CREW PROTECTION IN THE EVENT OF PRIMARY SHOCK PROTEC-
TION CIRCUIT FAILURE.
43. VALVES OR SIMILAR COMPONENTS THAT COULD BE OPERATED OUT-OF-
SEQUENCE SO THAT FLAMMABLE OR TOXIC FLUIDS COULD BE INTRODUCED
INTO THE HABITABLE AREAS OF THE SPACECRAFT SHALL BE PROVIDED
WITH INTERLOCKS TO PREVENT SUCH OPERATION.
44. ANY EQUIPMENT WHICH SUPPLIES A GAS TO BE INHALED BY A CREWMAN
SHALL INCLUDE A FILTER AS THE LAST COMPONENT BEFORE THE POINT OF
INHALATION.
21
SYSTEM SAFETY CHECKLIST - PART I
FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND EXPERIMENT HARDWARE DESIGN
SECTION: 1.0 SYSTEMS CRITERIA
1.6.2 MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND EXPERIMENTS (Cont.)
45. ASTRONAUT RESTRAINTS, SHOES, SEAT AND HANDLEBARS USED ON ERGOM-
ETERS AND COMPONENTS OF SIMILAR EQUIPMENT THAT MAY BE USED IN
CONJUNCTION WITH ELECTRONIC SENSING DEVICES, SUCH AS A VECTOR-
CARDIOGRAPH (VCG), SHALL BE ELECTRICALLY INSULATED TO PREVENT A
PARALLEL ELECTRICAL PATH WHICH COULD AFFECT THE INSTRUMENTATION.
46. ALL ELECTRODES AND FLEXIBLE TUBING UTILIZED IN MEDICAL EXPERI-
MENTS SHALL BE STRUCTURALLY CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING DECOMPRES-
SION AND RECOMPRESSION OF THE SPACECRAFT WITHOUT DAMAGE.
47. ALL MEDICAL EQUIPMENT TO BE PLACED AT THE ENTRANCE TO OR WITHIN
A BODY OPENING OF A SUBJECT DURING FLIGHT SHALL BE STERILIZED
AND INDIVIDUALLY PACKAGED.
1.6.3 SCIENTIFIC AIRLOCK (SAL) AND EVA TYPE EQUIPMENT
48. BASE SUPPORTS, BRACES, BUMPERS OR SIMILAR PROVISIONS SHALL BE
DESIGNED TO LIMIT THE MOVEMENT OF ANY CANTILEVERED SAL MOUNTED
EQUIPMENT SO THAT THE DESIGN LOAD LIMITS OF THE SAL ATTACH
POINTS WILL NOT BE EXCEEDED DUE TO INADVERTENT IMPACT.
49. ALL HANDLES USED FOR JETTISON OF EQUIPMENT EXTENDED THROUGH A
SCIENTIFIC AIRLOCK (SAL) SHALL HAVE GUARDS, COVERS OR SIMILAR
PROTECTION AGAINST INADVERTENT ACTUATION.
50. THERE SHALL BE A VISUAL INDICATING DEVICE TO SHOW THAT A MECH-
ANISM USED TO EXTEND EQUIPMENT EXTERNAL TO THE HABITABLE SPACE-
CRAFT AREA IS FULLY EXTENDED OR RETRACTED.
51. BOOMS REQUIRING EXTENSION BY THE USE OF EXTENSION ROD SEGMENTS
SHALL HAVE SAFETY LATCHES WHICH AT ALL TIMES PREVENT INADVERTENT
EJECTION OF EQUIPMENT DURING ASSEMBLY OF THE BOOM EXTENSION ROD.
52. BOOMS PROVIDING EXTENSION THROUGH AN AIRLOCK SHALL HAVE JETTISON
CAPABILITY WHEN THE BOOM OR EXTENSION ROD IS STUCK AT ANY POSI-
TION OR THE EXPERIMENT ON THE BOOM IS STUCK AT ANY POSITION
PREVENTING RETRACTION.
53. BOOM EXTENSION ROD CONNECTION POINTS SHALL HAVE POSITIVE LATCH-
ING MECHANISMS TO PREVENT INADVERTENT DISCONNECTION OF THE
EXTENSION ROD.
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1.6.3 SCIENTIFIC AIRLOCK (SAL) AND EVA TYPE EQUIPMENT
(Cont.)
54. BOOMS EXTENDED IN ORBITAL PAYLOADS SHALL BE STRUCTURALLY CAPABLE
OF WITHSTANDING ALL VEHICLE MOVEMENTS INCLUDING DOCKING MANEU-
VERS.
55. BOOM EXTENSION MECHANISMS SHALL NOT UTILIZE ANY MATERIALS THAT
OUTGAS CONTAMINANTS WHICH CAN AFFECT CONTAMINATION MEASUREMENT
EXPERIMENTS OR OTHER EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION-SENSITIVE ELEMENTS.
56. ANY LOCKING OR BRAKING SYSTEM ON A BOOM WHICH EXTENDS THROUGH A
SAL SHALL NOT DISTORT THE BOOM, WHEN CLAMPING FORCE IS APPLIED,
SUCH THAT THE BOOM CANNOT BE RETRACTED OR EJECTED.
57. ALL EXPERIMENTS AND EXPERIMENT COMPONENTS WHICH ARE DEPLOYED BY
AN EXTENDIBLE BOOM SHALL BE SECURED TO THE BOOM BY A POSITIVE
LOCKING MECHANISM.
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1. OPERATING RANGE AND PERFORMANCE LIMITS FOR ALL SYSTEMS AND EQUIP-
MENT SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN.
2. CLEANLINESS LEVELS AND CONTAMINATION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS SHALL
BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN.
3. COMPONENTS CONTAINING MERCURY SHALL NOT BE USED.
4. BERYLLIUM, BERYLLIUM OXIDES, OR BERYLLIUM ALLOYS SHALL NOT BE
USED INSIDE THE SPACECRAFT HABITABLE ENVIRONMENT.
5. COMPONENTS USED IN AREAS WITH FLAMMABLE VAPORS, LIQUIDS, OR
OTHER COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS SHALL BE INCAPABLE OF CAUSING
UNINTENTIONAL IGNITION.
6. EQUIPMENT DESIGN SHALL PRECLUDE THE GENERATION OF SOUND PRES-
SURE LEVELS ABOVE 85 db.
7. FRICTION TYPE LOCKING PINS IN WHICH THE LOCKING CAPABILITY
BECOMES DEGRADED AS A RESULT OF REPEATED USE SHALL NOT BE USED.
8. ALL CONNECTORS (E.G., ELECTRICAL, HYDRAULIC, PNEUMATIC) SHALL
HAVE TETHERED CAPS, PLUGS OR COVERS IN ORDER TO PROTECT AGAINST
CONTAMINATION OR DAMAGE WHEN UNMATED.
9. LOCKING PINS, KNOBS, HANDLES, LENS COVERS, ACCESS PLATES, AND
SIMILAR DEVICES WHICH MAY REQUIRE TEMPORARY REMOVAL SHALL BE
TETHERED OR OTHERWISE HELD CAPTIVE TO THE EQUIPMENT WITH WHICH
THEY ARE USED.
10. CHAINS, BEADED LINKS OR SIMILAR SEGMENTED DEVICES SHALL NOT BE
USED AS TETHERS OR RESTRAINTS.
11. SYSTEMS SHALL BE DESIGNED SO THAT IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO
INSTALL COMPONENTS IN REVERSE.
12. THE SETTING, POSITION OR ADJUSTMENT OF CONTROLS SHALL NOT BE
AFFECTED BY SHOCK, VIBRATION, OR ACCELERATION RESULTING FROM
LAUNCH, DOCKING, OR ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS.
13. ANTENNAS WHICH ARE DESIGNED WITH ELECTROMECHANICAL DRIVE MECH-
ANISMS TO PERMIT SCANNING SHALL INCLUDE A POSITIVE LOCKING DEVICE
TO HOLD THE ANTENNA IMMOBILE WHEN UNDER ALL OPERATIONAL LOADS.
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14. ANTENNAS WHICH ARE DESIGNED WITH ELECTROMECHANICAL DRIVE MECH-
ANISMS TO PERMIT SCANNING SHALL BE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE CREW
INDICATION OF ANTENNA POSITION AND LOCKING DEVICE OPERATION.
15. EQUIPMENT PERMANENTLY MOUNTED OR TO BE DEPLOYED EXTERNAL TO THE
SPACECRAFT HABITABLE ENVIRONMENT SHALL NOT CONTAIN MATERIALS
WHICH OUTGAS CONTAMINANTS THAT COULD AFFECT EXTERNAL CONTAMINA-
TION SENSITIVE ELEMENTS (E.G., WINDOWS, OPTICS).
16. EQUIPMENT REQUIRING ADJUSTMENT DURING OPERATION SHALL HAVE
EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENT PROVISIONS.
17. ALL MECHANICAL ACTUATING DEVICES SHALL HAVE POSITIVE MECHANICAL
STOPS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST FAILURES THAT COULD ALLOW THE
DEVICE TO EXCEED ITS INTENDED LIMITS OF TRAVEL.
18. ALL THREADED FASTENERS AND FITTINGS SHALL HAVE TORQUE SPECI-
FIED IN THE DESIGN, AND SHALL REQUIRE WRENCHING DEVICES FOR
ASSEMBLY AS OPPOSED TO KNURLED KNOBS, WING NUTS, ETC.
19. OPENINGS (SLOTTED OR OTHERWISE) IN CABINETS, COVERS, AND SIMI-
LAR ENCLOSURES THROUGH WHICH LEVERS, SHAFTS, AND SIMILAR CON-
TROLS OPERATE SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH NONFLAMMABLE PROTECTIVE
COVERS, BOOTS, OR SLIDING PLATES TO PREVENT PERSONNEL INJURY OR
EQUIPMENT DAMAGE RESULTING FROM INADVERTENT INSERTION OR ENTRY
OF FOREIGN OBJECTS.
20. HANDLES AND CONTROLS FOR MECHANISMS SUCH AS HATCHES, AIRLOCKS,.
AND FOLDING PLATFORMS SHALL BE DESIGNED WITH SUFFICIENT CLEAR-
ANCES TO PREVENT INJURY TO FINGERS AND HANDS.
21. ALL HANDHOLDS AND HANDRAILS SHALL PROVIDE A MINIMUM CLEARANCE OF
2.0 INCHES BETWEEN THE GRIPPING SURFACE AND ANY ADJACENT STRUC-
TURE, AND SHALL PROVIDE A MINIMUM OF 5.5 INCHES OF STRAIGHT
GRASPING LONGITUDINAL SURFACE.
22. ALL INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL EQUIPMENT AND STRUCTURAL SURFACES IN-
CLUDING COVERS, DOORS, REMOVABLE PANELS AND CONTAINERS SHALL BE
FREE OF SHARP EDGES AND CORNERS FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL
AND EQUIPMENT.
23. ACCESS DOORS, COVERS OR HATCHES WHICH ARE NOT REMOVABLE SHALL
REMAIN IN THE DESIRED OPEN POSITION BY USE OF FRICTION OR OTHER
DEVICES.
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24. ANY DOOR OR HATCH WHICH IS REQUIRED TO ISOLATE THE HABITABLE
AREAS OF THE SPACECRAFT (CABIN ATMOSPHERE) FROM SPACE VACUUM
SHALL HAVE REDUNDANT SEALS.
929 ALL HATCHES REQUIRED FOR ASTRONAUT INGRESS TO OR EGRESS FROM THE
SPACECRAFT OR BETWEEN COMPARTMENTS SHALL BE DESIGNED TO PERMIT
INFLIGHT REPLACEMENT OF HATCH SEALS.
26. EXPERIMENT AIRLOCKS AND SIMILAR MECHANICAL DEVICES THAT PENE-
TRATE THE PRESSURE SHELL OF THE HABITABLE AREA OF THE SPACECRAFT
SHALL BE DESIGNED TO PERMIT INFLIGHT REPLACEMENT OF SEALS.
27. ALL GLASS OR SIMILAR SHATTERABLE MATERIAL SHALL BE COVERED WITH
A SOLID MATERIAL (TRANSPARENT IF REQUIRED) TO PROTECT AGAINST
THE INTRODUCTION OF PARTICLES INTO THE SPACECRAFT HABITABLE
ENVIRONMENT AS A RESULT OF BREAKAGE.
28. CONTROLS WHICH COULD CAUSE EQUIPMENT DAMAGE OR PERSONNEL INJURY
IF OPERATED DURING GROUND OPERATIONS SHALL BE IDENTIFIED IN THE
DESIGN.
29. WARNING PLACARDS OR LABELS SHALL BE PROVIDED ON ALL CONTROLS
WHICH ARE NOT TO BE OPERATED DURING GROUND OPERATIONS.
30. ALL PLATFORMS, HANDRAILS, BOOMS, BOOM EXTENSION DEVICES AND
SIMILAR INSTALLATIONS THAT ARE NOT DESIGNED FOR USE IN A ONE-G
ENVIRONMENT SHALL BE PLACARDED WITH LOAD LIMITS AND PROTECTED
FROM INADVERTENT USAGE DURING GROUND OPERATIONS.
31. EMERGENCY CONTROLS (ELECTRICAL OR MECHANICAL) USED FOR SHUTDOWN,
SAFING, JETTISON, ALARM OR CORRECTIVE ACTION SHALL BE CLEARLY
MARKED, (E.G., PLACARDS, RED BOARDERS, ETC.), VISIBLE AND
READILY ACCESSIBLE TO OPERATING PERSONNEL.
32. DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS FOR SUBSYSTEM EQUIPMENT (E.G., CONSOLES,
PANELS, ETC.), EXPERIMENTS AND OTHER PAYLOAD HARDWARE, INCLUDING
SHIPPING OR STORAGE CONTAINERS FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT SHALL SPECIFY
THAT THE LOCATION OF LIFT POINTS, ATTACH POINTS, CENTER OF
GRAVITY AND GROSS WEIGHT SHALL BE IDENTIFIED ON ALL SUCH EQUIP-
MENT FOR WHICH LIFTING, HOISTING OR HANDLING FIXTURES MAY BE
REQUIRED (E.G., HANDLING, INSTALLATION OR REMOVAL PRIOR TO OR
AFTER FLIGHT).
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33. ALL EQUIPMENT WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED TO BE LIFTED OR MOVED BY A
HOIST, CRANE, FORKLIFT OR OTHER EQUIPMENT SHALL HAVE PROVISIONS
FOR TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT INSTALLATION OF ATTACH POINTS, LIFT-
ING EYES, TIE-DOWNS, AND SIMILAR HARDWARE FOR POSITIVE ATTACH-
MENT OF SLINGS, CABLE HOOKS AND SIMILAR DEVICES.
34. WARNING PLACARDS, SAFETY TAPE, COLOR CODED LABELS AND SIMILAR
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION MATERIAL SHALL BE PLACED IN A CLEARLY
VISIBLE LOCATION.
35. ALL HANDLES, KNOBS, LATCHES, HATCHES, AND SIMILAR MECHANICAL
DEVICES THAT REQUIRE ALIGNMENT OR ADJUSTMENT SHALL HAVE ALIGN-
MENT INDICES OR VISIBLE MARKINGS TO ENSURE PROPER ALIGNMENT,
ADJUSTMENT, AND OPERATION INCLUDING REALIGNMENT IN FLIGHT.
36. LOCATION OF ALIGNMENT INDICES, DETENTS, RIGGING POINTS OR ALIGN-
MENT MARKS SHALL BE ACCESSIBLE FOR ALIGNMENT RECHECK WITHOUT
REMOVAL OF ANY COMPONENT.
37. ALL FAN BLADES, PUMP IMPELLERS AND SIMILAR ROTATING MECHANISMS
SHALL HAVE PROTECTIVE DEVICES SUCH AS A SHEAR PIN, FRICTION
CLUTCH, MAGNETIC CLUTCH OR SIMILAR DEVICE TO PROTECT THE DRIVE
MECHANISM.
38. MOVING PARTS SUCH AS FANS, BELT DRIVE ASSEMBLIES AND SIMILAR
COMPONENTS THAT COULD CAUSE PERSONNEL INJURY OR EQUIPMENT
DAMAGE DUE TO INADVERTENT CONTACT WITH SUCH EQUIPMENT SHALL BE
PROVIDED WITH GUARDS OR SIMILAR PROTECTIVE DEVICES.
39. EQUIPMENT UTILIZING ROTATING MECHANISMS SHALL INCORPORATE PRO-
VISIONS FOR CONTAINMENT OF FAILED PARTS.
40. LOCK OR LATCHING MECHANISMS SHALL BE OPERABLE BY A SINGLE CON-
TROL AND PROVIDE CLEAR VISUAL INDICATION OF LATCH POSITION.
41. FOLD AWAY OR FOLD OVER TYPE LATCHING DEVICES THAT MUST BE IN
THE FOLDED POSITION TO ASSURE POSITIVE LOCKING SHALL BE SPRING
LOADED OR PINNED IN THE FOLDED POSITION TO PREVENT INADVERTENT
OPENING DUE TO VIBRATION.
42. ALL SPACECRAFT WINDOWS SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH INTERNAL COVERS
TO PROTECT THE WINDOW WHEN NOT IN USE DURING FLIGHT AND GROUND
OPERATIONS.
27
SYSTEM SAFETY CHECKLIST - PART I
FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND EXPERIMENT HARDWARE DESIGN
SECTION: 2.0 GENERAL CRITERIA
43. ALL SPACECRAFT WINDOWS SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH EXTERNAL COVERS
TO PROTECT THE WINDOW DURING GROUND OPERATIONS, AND DURING
FLIGHT AS APPROPRIATE FOR UV-SENSITIVE GLASS, ETC.
44. ALL SPACECRAFT INTERNAL WINDOW COVERS SHALL BE STRUCTURALLY
CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING A MINIMUM PRESSURE EQUAL TO 4.0 TIMES
THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ACROSS THE SPACECRAFT PRESSURE SHELL
DURING ON-ORBIT OPERATIONS.
45. WINDOW COVERS, EXPERIMENT DOORS AND SIMILAR ASSEMBLIES DESIGNED
FOR AUTOMATIC OR REMOTE CONTROL OPERATION SHALL BE CAPABLE OF
BEING DISABLED AND MANUALLY OPERATED (E.G., DRIVE MECHANISM
MECHANICAL OVERRIDE), IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE TO OPEN OR CLOSE.
46. DEPLOYED EQUIPMENT CHILLED BELOW THE CABIN DEW POINT SHALL BE
PROTECTED AGAINST CONDENSATION WHEN RE-INTRODUCED TO THE CABIN
ENVIRONMENT.
47. EQUIPMENT CONTAINING LENSES SUCH AS CAMERAS, VIEWFINDERS,
TELESCOPES, ETC., SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH VIEWING ELEMENT COVERS.
48. CLEANING AGENTS AND PROCESSES THAT ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE
SYSTEM (E.G., COMPONENT MATERIALS, METAL SURFACES, COATINGS AND
COMMODITIES USED WITHIN THE SYSTEM) SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE
DESIGN.
49. ALL CONTAINERS SUCH AS FILM CONTAINERS WHICH MAY BE PRESSURIZED
WITH AN INERT GAS SHALL HAVE A POSITIVE PRESSURE INDICATING
DEVICE.
50. ALL CONTAINERS THAT ARE PRESSURIZED WITH INERT GAS SHALL BE
TESTED TO A MINIMUM PROOF PRESSURE EQUIVALENT TO 2.0 TIMES THE
MAXIMUM PRESSURE TO WHICH THEY WILL BE EXPOSED.
51. ALL CONTAINERS THAT ARE PRESSURIZED WITH INERT GAS SHALL HAVE A
MINIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE OF 4.0 TIMES THE MAXIMUM DIF-
FERENTIAL PRESSURE TO WHICH THEY WILL BE EXPOSED.
52. ALL EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENT CONTAINERS AND ENCLOSURES WITHIN THE
HABITABLE AREAS OF THE SPACECRAFT SHALL BE STRUCTURALLY CAPABLE
OF WITHSTANDING DECOMPRESSION AND RECOMPRESSION OF THE-SPACE-
CRAFT WITHOUT DAMAGE.
28
SYSTEM SAFETY CHECKLIST - PART I
FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND EXPERIMENT HARDWARE DESIGN
SECTION: 2.0 GENERAL CRITERIA
53. RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SHALL NOT BE USED FOR ILLUMINATING PUR-
POSES WITHOUT POSITIVE MECHANICAL PROTECTION AGAINST ABRASION
OR FLAKING UNDER ALL POTENTIAL CONDITIONS OF USE.
54. RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SHALL NOT BE USED FOR ANY PURPOSE UNLESS
IT CAN BE PROVEN THAT A NON-RADIOACTIVE SUBSTITUTE MATERIAL
CANNOT BE USED.
55. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL EMBODIED OR SUSPENDED BY CERAMIC MATERIAL,
PAINT OR SIMILAR COATINGS SHALL NOT RELEASE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
AT ALL INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXTREMES ANTICIPATED
DURING GROUND OR FLIGHT OPERATIONS.
56. ALL TEMPERATURE GAGES, PRESSURE GAGES, ELECTRICAL METERS AND
SIMILAR READOUT DEVICES SHALL BE COLOR BANDED TO INDICATE SYSTEM
OPERATING, MARGINAL AND HAZARDOUS RANGE LIMITS.
57. ALL TEMPERATURE GAGES, PRESSURE GAGES, ELECTRICAL METERS AND
SIMILAR READOUT DEVICES SHALL INDICATE NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATING
RANGE WITHIN THE CENTER 50 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL RANGE OF THE
READOUT DEVICE.
58. DEBRIS GUARDS, SCREENS, FILTERS AND SIMILAR DEVICES SHALL BE
LOCATED AT THE INLET TO ROTATING MECHANISMS SUCH AS DUCT-MOUNTED
FAN ASSEMBLIES, COOLANT PUMPS AND SIMILAR ASSEMBLIES.
59. HANDLES AND KNOBS ON ALL ROTARY CONTROLS SHALL BE KEYED OR
SHAPED SO THAT IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO TURN ON
THE SHAFT. FURTHERMORE, EACH ROTARY CONTROL ASSEMBLY SHALL BE
POSITIVELY KEYED OR PINNED TO ITS MOUNTING SURFACE TO ENSURE
PROTECTION AGAINST SIMULTANEOUS ROTATION OF THE HANDLE, SHAFT
AND CONTROL ASSEMBLY.
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3.1 GENERAL
1. ALL ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS AND CABLE INSTALLATIONS SHALL BE
DESIGNED WITH SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY, LENGTH, AND ACCESSIBILITY
TO PERMIT DISCONNECTION AND RECONNECTION WITHOUT DAMAGE TO
WIRING OR CONNECTORS.
2. GUIDE PINS OR SLIDES SHALL BE LOCATED ON ALL PANEL, DRAWER AND
CHASSIS SUBASSEMBLIES FOR PURPOSES OF ALIGNMENT DURING INSTALLA-
TION AND TO PREVENT CONTACT OF THE PANEL, CHASSIS OR DRAWER WITH
EXPOSED TERMINALS INTERNAL TO THE EQUIPMENT DURING INSTALLATION
AND REMOVAL.
3. ALL CONTROL SHAFTS, KNOBS, HANDLES OR LEVERS SHALL BE GROUNDED,
INSULATED OR MADE OF NONCONDUCTIVE MATERIAL IN ORDER TO PRE-
CLUDE PERSONNEL SHOCK OR BURN.
4. RECEPTACLES WHOSE MATING PLUGS HAVING LOCKING FEATURES REQUIR-
ING A TWISTING MOTION (BAYONET OR THREADED TYPES) SHALL BE
POSITIVELY KEYED OR PINNED TO THEIR MOUNTING SURFACE SO THAT IS
IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE RECEPTACLE TO TURN DURING
PLUG ATTACHMENT.
5. ALL EXTERNAL PARTS OF RF EQUIPMENT, EXCLUDING THE DRIVEN ELE-
MENTS OF THE ANTENNA AND TRANSMISSION LINES, SHALL BE AT GROUND
POTENTIAL AT ALL TIMES.
6. RF EQUIPMENT SHALL BE SHIELDED TO PREVENT PERSONNEL EXPOSURE TO
RF LEVELS GREATER THAN 10 mw/cm 2 EXCEPT IN FRONT OF THE ANTENNA.
7. CATHODE RAY TUBES SHALL BE COVERED IN FRONT WITH A SAFETY SHIELD
TO PROTECT PERSONNEL FROM TUBE IMPLOSION.
8. CONFORMAL COATINGS WHICH MAY OVERSTRESS COMPONENTS SUCH AS GLASS
DIODES SHALL NOT BE USED.
9. POLYURETHANE CONFORMAL COATINGS CONTAINING SOLVENTS WHICH DIS-
SOLVE POLYSTYRENE SHALL NOT BE USED ON CIRCUIT BOARDS CONTAINING
POLYSTYRENE COMPONENTS.
10. ULTRASONIC VIBRATION SHALL NOT BE SPECIFIED AS A METHOD FOR
CLEANING ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLIES.
11. GASKETS, SEALS AND SIMILAR COMPONENTS CONTAINING SULPHUR SHALL
NOT BE USED WITHIN OR IN CONTACT WITH ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTAINING COPPER, ZINC, NICKEL, OR SILVER.
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3.1 GENERAL (Cont.)
12. THE DESIGN OF MOUNTING SURFACES AND ATTACHMENT HARDWARE FOR ALL
ELECTRICAL CONTACTOR ASSEMBLIES (E.G., SWITCHES, RELAYS, ETC.),
SHALL MAINTAIN THE CONTACTS IN A HERMETICALLY SEALED ENVIRON-
MENT.
13. ALL CONNECTORS, CIRCUIT BOARDS, TERMINAL BOARDS, SWITCHES,
RELAYS AND SIMILAR COMPONENTS SHALL BE POTTED, SEALED, OR OTHER-
WISE PROTECTED AGAINST SHORTING BY MATERIALS FLOATING IN A
ZERO-G ENVIRONMENT.
14. ALL CONNECTORS, CIRCUIT BOARDS, TERMINAL BOARDS, SWITCHES,
RELAYS AND SIMILAR COMPONENTS SHALL BE POTTED, SEALED, OR
OTHERWISE PROTECTED AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF LIQUID LEAKAGE OR
CONDENSATION.
15. GUARDS OR COVERS SHALL BE PROVIDED OVER ALL TERMINATION POINTS
WHERE VOLTAGE POTENTIALS EXIST IF ACCESS IS POSSIBLE WITH VOLT-
AGE APPLIED.
16. ALL GUARDS OR COVERS PROVIDED FOR PERSONNEL PROTECTION SHALL BE
CLEARLY MARKED TO INDICATE THE VOLTAGE POTENTIAL OF THE COVERED
TERMINAL.
17. INSULATED GUIDES SHALL BE PROVIDED WHEREVER AN ADJUSTMENT TOOL
COULD CONTACT ANY ADJACENT CIRCUIT COMPONENT HAVING A VOLTAGE
POTENTIAL.
18. ALL PORTABLE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT SHALL BE DESIGNED SO THAT AN
INTERNAL SHORT WILL NOT RESULT IN A VOLTAGE POTENTIAL BEING
APPLIED TO THE CASE OR ENCLOSURE.
19. EQUIPMENT SHALL REVERT TO A SAFE CONFIGURATION WHEN AN INPUT
POWER LOSS OCCURS.
20. ALL HEATERS SHALL HAVE INDEPENDENT REDUNDANT CIRCUITS FOR
TEMPERATURE SENSING AND CONTROL.
21. HEATERS SHALL HAVE OVERTEMPERATURE SHUT-OFF DEVICES INDEPEN-
DENT OF ANY THERMOSTAT) WHICH REQUIRE MANUAL RESET.
22. ANY SYSTEM WHICH HAS A CAPABILITY OF LOCKING OUT GROUND COM-
MAND CONTROL SHALL PROVIDE AN INDICATION TO THE GROUND WHENEVER
THE CONTROL(S) IS IN THE LOCKED-OUT POSITION.
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3.2 CABLING AND WIRING
23. ALL CABLES AND WIRING SHALL BE CLAMPED AND SUPPORTED TO REMAIN
CLEAR OF SHARP EDGES AND MOVING PARTS.
24. ALL CABLES AND WIRING SHALL BE CONFIGURED, CLAMPED AND SUP-
PORTED TO ELIMINATE MECHANICAL STRESS ON WIRES, TERMINATIONS
AND CONNECTORS DURING GROUND AND FLIGHT ENVIRONMENTS (E.G.,
SHOCK, VIBRATIONS, ETC.).
25. ALL CABLES AND WIRES SHALL BE MARKED TO CLEARLY INDICATE THE
CORRECT MATING CONNECTION OR TERMINATION POINT IN ORDER TO
PRECLUDE PHASE REVERSAL OR CROSS-CONNECTION.
26. ALL WIRING SHALL BE LOCATED AND CLAMPED TO ELIMINATE ANY POSSI-
BILITY OF CONTACT WITH LIQUID LINES.
27. THE DESIGN SHALL SPECIFY THAT WIRING SHALL NOT BE SPLICED.
28. POWER AND SIGNAL (INCLUDING COMMAND) WIRING SHALL NOT BE ROUTED
THROUGH THE SAME CABLE, CABLE BUNDLE, OR WIRING HARNESS IN
ORDER TO MINIMIZE VOLTAGE INDUCTION INTO ADJACENT CIRCUITS.
29. SHIELDS USED TO PROTECT AGAINST INDUCED VOLTAGE FOR FREQUENCIES
UP TO 50 KHz SHALL BE CONTINUOUS THROUGH ALL CONNECTORS AND
GROUNDED AT ONLY ONE END.
30. SHIELDS USED TO PROTECT AGAINST INDUCED VOLTAGE FOR FREQUENCIES
ABOVE 50 KHz SHALL BE CONTINUOUS THROUGH ALL CONNECTORS AND
GROUNDED AT BOTH ENDS.
31. POLYVINYL CHLORIDE SHALL NOT BE USED AS WIRE INSULATION.
32. ELECTRICAL WIRE OR CABLE INSULATED OR COATED WITH POLYTETRA-
FLUOROETHYLENE (TFE) OR FLUORINATED ETHYLENE PROPYLENE (FEP)
SHALL BE ETCHED PRIOR TO POTTING TO ASSURE POSITIVE BOND AND
ENVIRONMENTAL SEAL.
33. WHEN ETCHING OF INSULATION IS REQUIRED, THE DESIGN SHALL SPECIFY
THAT THE OPEN END OF THE WIRE WILL NOT BE EXPOSED TO THE ETCHANT.
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3.2 CABLING AND WIRING (Cont.)
34. CABLING OR WIRING LOCATED OUTSIDE THE HABITABLE AREA OF THE
SPACECRAFT SHALL BE CAPABLE OF FLEXING WITHOUT DAMAGE TO THE
WIRE OR INSULATION AT THE EXTREME TEMPERATURE ENVIRONMENT OF
SPACE.
35. WIRES AND CABLES SHALL NOT BE IDENTIFIED OR MARKED BY HOT
STAMPING ON THE INSULATION.
36. SOLID WIRE (SINGLE STRAND) SHALL NOT BE USED IN LOCATIONS
WHERE IT MAY BE SUBJECTED TO FLEXING.
3.3 CONNECTORS
37. ALL MATING PLUGS AND RECEPTACLES SHALL BE MARKED OR CODED TO
CLEARLY INDICATE THE CORRECT MATING CONNECTION.
38. ALL ADJACENT CONNECTORS SHALL BE SHAPED OR RESTRAINED SO THAT
IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MISMATE.
39. CONNECTORS WITH UNKEYED SYMMETRICAL PIN ARRANGEMENTS SHALL NOT
BE USED.
40. ONLY FEMALE CONNECTORS SHALL BE USED AS ACCESS TO SOURCES OF
POWER.
41. ALL FLIGHT OR PROTOTYPE SYSTEM CONNECTORS WHICH INTERFACE WITH
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SHALL BE INDIVIDUALLY SHAPED OR RE-
STRAINED SO THAT IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MISMATE THE
INTERFACING GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT CONNECTORS.
42. POWER CIRCUITS AND SIGNAL CIRCUITS SHALL NOT BE ROUTED THROUGH
THE SAME CONNECTOR IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE INTRODUCTION OF
VOLTAGE TRANSIENTS INTO THE SIGNAL WIRING.
43. ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS USED WITHIN THE HABITABLE AREAS OF THE
SPACECRAFT SHALL HAVE SELF-LOCKING DEVICES AND SHALL NOT REQUIRE
THE USE OF SAFETY WIRE.
44. SHORTING DEVICES SUCH AS SPRINGS OR CLIPS SHALL NOT BE USED IN
CONNECTORS.
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3.4 BATTERIES
45. BATTERIES SHALL HAVE DECALS OR MARKERS TO INDICATE THE TYPE OF
ELECTROLYTE AND SPECIAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS.
46. ALL BATTERY VENTS AND RELIEF DEVICES SHALL BE DESIGNED TO
PREVENT THE EJECTION OF ELECTROLYTE FROM THE BATTERY.
47. ALL BATTERY VENTS AND RELIEF DEVICE OUTLETS SHALL BE LOCATED
TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE TO ADJACENT EQUIPMENT OR INJURY TO OPERAT-
ING PERSONNEL.
48. BATTERIES SHALL NOT BE VENTED INTO THE HABITABLE AREAS OF THE
SPACECRAFT.
49. ALL BATTERIES SHALL HAVE DECALS OR MARKERS TO CLEARLY INDICATE
THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE TERMINALS.
50. ALL BATTERY CASES SHALL BE DESIGNED TO CONTAIN ALL ELECTROLYTE
DURING ALL OVERPRESSURE CONDITIONS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH COULD
BE CAUSED BY OVERLOAD OR INTERNAL SHORTS.
51. INSTALLED BATTERIES (SINGLE OR MULTIPLE CELLED) SHALL BE EN-
CLOSED WITHIN A CONTAINER WHICH WILL PREVENT ELECTROLYTE
LEAKAGE INTO THE SURROUNDING AREA IN THE EVENT OF DAMAGE TO THE
BATTERY CASE.
52. THE DESIGN SHALL SPECIFY THAT ALL BATTERIES AND CHARGER ASSEM-
BLIES SHALL BE TESTED AT FULL OPERATIONAL LOADS PRIOR TO
INSTALLATION INTO THE SPACECRAFT, EXPERIMENT OR OTHER PAYLOAD.
3.5 CONTROL FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS
53. ALL SWITCHES SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED OR LABELED TO INDICATE THE
SYSTEM FUNCTION FOR EACH SWITCH POSITION.
54. NEGATIVE CONTROL OR SWITCHING IN THE POWER RETURN LEADS OF A
COMPONENT SHALL NOT BE USED UNLESS THE POSITIVE LEAD IS SWITCHED
SIMULTANEOUSLY.
55. SELF-TEST CIRCUITS SHALL INDICATE THE ACTUAL SYSTEM RESPONSE,
RATHER THAN INDICATE ONLY THE INITIATION OF A COMMAND OR TEST
SIGNAL.
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3.5 CONTROL FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS (Cont.)
56. SELF-LATCHING FUNCTION SWITCHES SUCH AS PUSHBUTTON SWITCH-
INDICATORS WHICH MAY BE OPERATED WITHOUT INDICATING THE SWITCH
POSITION DURING A POWER OFF PHASE SHALL NOT BE USED.
57. ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS OR SWITCHES USED TO CONTROL EQUIPMENT OR
CIRCUITRY INTENDED FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES SHALL HAVE POSITIVE
PROTECTION AGAINST INADVERTENT OPERATION.
58. ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS OR SWITCHES USED TO CONTROL THE ARMING OF
PYROTECHNIC DEVICES SHALL HAVE POSITIVE PROTECTION AGAINST
INADVERTENT OPERATION.
59. REDUNDANT CONTROL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS SHALL BE INDEPENDENT OF
THOSE COMPONENTS USED IN THE PRIMARY CONTROL CIRCUIT.
60. PRIMARY AND REDUNDANT CONTROL CIRCUIT WIRING SHALL NOT BE ROUTED
THROUGH THE SAME CABLE OR CONNECTOR.
61. PRIMARY AND REDUNDANT CONTROL CIRCUITS SHALL INCLUDE AN INFLIGHT
CHECKOUT CAPABILITY WHICH WILL VERIFY THE INDEPENDENT OPERATION
OF EACH CIRCUIT.
62. PRIMARY AND REDUNDANT SYSTEM CIRCUITS SHALL NOT BE SUPPLIED FROM
THE SAME BRANCH POWER BUS OR CIRCUIT BREAKER.
63. ALL CIRCUITS (INCLUDING LATCHING RELAY CIRCUITS) SHALL BE PRO-
TECTED AGAINST INADVERTENT OPERATION DUE TO VOLTAGE TRANSIENTS.
64. ALL SYSTEM INDICATORS USED TO MONITOR SYSTEM STATUS SHALL INDI-
CATE THE ACTUAL SYSTEM RESPONSE RATHER THAN INDICATE ONLY THE
INITIATION OF A COMMAND OR APPLICATION OF POWER.
65. LOSS OF CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER SHALL NOT RESULT IN POWER LOSS TO
DEVICES WHICH INDICATE RESPONSE OR CONFIGURATION STATUS OF CON-
TROLLED COMPONENTS, (I.E., POWER FOR INDICATORS OR INSTRUMEN-
TATION USED TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION, PRESSURE LEVELS, ETC.,
SHALL BE INDEPENDENT AND ISOLATED FROM FAILURES IN CONTROL
CIRCUITS FOR THOSE VALVES OR SENSORS).
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3.5 CONTROL FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS (Cont.)
66. TERMINAL LUGS AND INSULATED WASHERS USED WITH STUD-MOUNTED
DIODES SHALL HAVE SUFFICIENT MATCHING SURFACE AREA TO ENSURE
THAT THE TERMINAL LUG WILL REMAIN INSULATED FROM THE MOUNTING
STRUCTURE.
67. POSITIVE MECHANICAL MEANS SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN TO
ENSURE ADEQUATE CONTACT PRESSURE IS MAINTAINED AT STUD-MOUNTED
DIODE CONNECTIONS.
68. POSITIVE PROVISIONS SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN TO PRECLUDE
SEEPAGE OF CONFORMAL COATINGS INTO ELECTRICAL INTERFACES IN
STUD-MOUNTED DIODE INSTALLATIONS.
69. ALL POWER AND SIGNAL RETURNS FOR FLIGHT SYSTEMS, EXPERIMENTS OR
OTHER PAYLOAD SHALL BE ISOLATED FROM THE CHASSIS AND SHALL BE
ROUTED THROUGH CONNECTORS OR TERMINALS TO A SINGLE POINT GROUND
TERMINATION FOR INTERFACE WITH THE SPACECRAFT SINGLE POINT
GROUNDING SYSTEM.
70. SPACECRAFT STRUCTURE SHALL NOT BE USED FOR THE RETURN OF CURRENT
TO THE POWER SOURCE.
3.6 OVERLOAD PROTECTION
71. CIRCUIT BREAKERS SHALL PROVIDE A VISUAL INDICATION WHEN TRIPPED.
72. CIRCUIT BREAKERS SHALL TRIP AND PROTECT THE CIRCUIT EVEN IF THE
SWITCH LEVER IS PHYSICALLY HELD IN THE "ON" POSITION.
73. OVERLOAD PROTECTION DEVICES SHALL BE INSTALLED IN EACH UN-
GROUNDED CONDUCTOR IN THREE (3) PHASE POWER SYSTEMS AND SHALL BE
DESIGNED SO THAT ALL THREE (3) DEVICES TRIP SIMULTANEOUSLY.
74. ALL ADJUSTABLE TYPE CIRCUIT BREAKER SETTINGS SHALL BE SPECIFIED
IN THE DESIGN.
75. ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS SHALL BE SIZED (OR SET) TO PROTECT THE
SMALLEST WIRE WITHIN A CIRCUIT, INCLUDING ALL BRANCHES WHICH DO
NOT HAVE INDEPENDENT CIRCUIT PROTECTION.
76. OVERLOAD PROTECTION DEVICES SHALL BE SIZED (OR SET) SO THAT THE
COMBINATION OF CURRENT AND TIME AT WHICH THE DEVICE OPERATES
WILL NOT CAUSE THE OPERATION OF UPSTREAM PROTECTIVE DEVICES.
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3.6 OVERLOAD PROTECTION (Cont.)
77. A CIRCUIT BREAKER OR SIMILAR OVERLOAD PROTECTION SHALL BE
PROVIDED IN EACH EXPERIMENT OR OTHER PAYLOAD IN ORDER TO
PREVENT AN OVERLOAD IN ONE EXPERIMENT OR PAYLOAD FROM AFFECT-
ING OTHER EXPERIMENTS OR INTERFACING EQUIPMENT.
37
SYSTEM SAFETY CHECKLIST - PART I
FLIGHT SYSTEMS AND EXPERIMENT HARDWARE DESIGN
SECTION: 4.0 LIQUIDS AND GASES
4.1 GENERAL
1. SYSTEMS SHALL BE DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF SHOCK
WAVES OR PRESSURE SURGES GENERATED BY SUDDEN CHANGES IN FLOW.
2. ALL PRESSURE REGULATOR, FLOW CONTROL, AND RELIEF DEVICE SETTINGS
SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN.
3. PROOF TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL COMPONENTS SHALL BE A MINIMUM OF
1.5 TIMES THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE AT WHICH THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO
OPERATE WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
4. ALL MATERIALS INCLUDING SEALS, GASKETS AND LUBRICANTS USED IN
FLIGHT EQUIPMENT SHALL BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE SYSTEM COMMODITY
AND SHALL MEET THE CLEANLINESS LEVELS AND CONTAMINATION CONTROL
REQUIREMENTS OF THE INTERFACING FLIGHT SYSTEM, EXPERIMENT OR
OTHER PAYLOAD HARDWARE FOR WHICH THE MOST STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS
HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED.
5. ALL PIPING AND COMPONENTS WITHIN EACH SYSTEM SHALL BE ELEC-
TRICALLY BONDED ACROSS EACH CONNECTION (ALL PIPING SEGMENTS) AND
SHALL BE GROUNDED TO REDUCE STATIC ELECTRICAL POTENTIAL.
6. ALL LIQUID AND GAS SYSTEMS SHALL BE DESIGNED TO PERMIT LEAK
TESTING AFTER INSTALLATION.
7. ISOLATION VALVES SHALL BE PROVIDED AT THE FLIGHT SYSTEM INTER-
FACE FOR INDEPENDENTLY CONTROLLING LIQUIDS, GASES AND VACUUM
BEING SUPPLIED TO EACH SUBSYSTEM, EXPERIMENT OR OTHER PAYLOAD.
8. AN ISOLATION SHUTOFF VALVE SHALL BE INSTALLED IN EACH SYSTEM,
EXPERIMENT OR PAYLOAD SUPPLIED FROM A COMMON LIQUID OR GAS
PRESSURE SOURCE.
9. ALL EQUIPMENT REQUIRING GAS FOR PURGING OR PRESSURIZATION SHALL
INCLUDE A HAND VALVE AT THE INLET TO THE RECEIVING EQUIPMENT OR
AS THE FIRST COMPONENT DOWNSTREAM OF THE RECEIVING EQUIPMENT
INTERFACE WHENEVER THE SOURCE PRESSURE SHUTOFF VALVE IS NOT
ACCESSIBLE TO THE OPERATOR AT THE WORK STATION OR EQUIPMENT
RECEIVING THE GAS.
10. ELECTRICAL OR ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS SUCH AS MOTORS, SENSORS, OR
SWITCHES USED IN LIQUID OR GAS SYSTEMS SHALL BE INSTALLED WITH
THE COMPONENT HOUSING EXTERNAL TO THE VESSEL OR PIPING CONTAIN-
ING THE LIQUID OR GAS.
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4.1 GENERAL (Cont.)
11. TUBING CAPS, PLUGS, OR BLIND FLANGES (END PLATES) SHALL BE IN-
STALLED ON ALL TEST AND SERVICE PORTS WHICH ARE NOT REQUIRED TO
FUNCTION IN FLIGHT.
12. PUMPS AND COMPRESSORS SHALL BE PROTECTED AGAINST DAMAGE BY USE
OF PROTECTIVE DEVICES SUCH AS THERMAL OVERLOADS, BY-PASS RELIEF
DEVICES, VIBRATION SENSITIVE CUTOUT SWITCHES, PUMP SUCTION
PRESSURE INTERLOCKS AND OVERSPEED CONTROLS.
13. FILTERS SHALL BE INSTALLED IN PUMP AND COMPRESSOR INLET LINES
WITH PRESSURE INDICATORS ON EACH SIDE OF THE FILTER OR A
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE GAGE.
14. FILTER HOUSINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO BE REMOVED FROM THE SYSTEM
FOR ELEMENT REPLACEMENT SHALL NOT BE USED.
15. DISSIMILAR METALS SHALL NOT BE USED IN COOLANT SYSTEM COMPONENTS
IF A GALVANIC CIRCUIT IS THEREBY ESTABLISHED WITH THE COOLANT
ACTING AS ELECTROLYTE.
16. LIQUID LINE INSULATION SHALL BE MADE OF NONABSORBENT MATERIALS.
17. TITANIUM OR ITS ALLOYS SHALL NOT BE USED IN OXYGEN SYSTEMS.
18. TITANIUM OR ITS ALLOYS SHALL NOT BE USED WITH METHANOL.
4.2 LINES
19. ALL LINES AND FLEXIBLE HOSES SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM DESIGN BURST
PRESSURE OF 4.0 TIMES THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE AT WHICH THEY WILL
BE REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
20. ALL LINES SHALL BE FIRMLY SUPPORTED TO PROTECT AGAINST DAMAGE
FROM MECHANICAL STRESS AND VIBRATION.
21. ALL LINES SHALL BE INDEPENDENTLY CLAMPED.
22. ALL LINES SHALL BE SUPPORTED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO LINE END
FITTINGS AND CONNECTORS TO REDUCE MECHANICAL STRESS (INCLUDING
SIDE LOADS) AND VIBRATION AT THE CONNECTION POINT.
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4.2 LINES (Cont.)
23. ALL RIGID LINES USED IN FIXED APPLICATIONS SHALL BE SUPPORTED
AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE AT EACH BEND IN THE LINE.
24. SERVICE POINTS FOR FILLING, DRAINING, PURGING, OR BLEEDING
SYSTEMS DURING GROUND OPERATIONS SHALL BE LOCATED EXTERNAL TO
THE SPACECRAFT.
25. ALL LINES IN ALL ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL LOCATIONS OF THE
SPACECRAFT (E.G., HABITABLE AREAS, EVA ROUTES AND EXPERIMENT
WORK STATIONS) SHALL HAVE SLEEVES, BARRIERS, OR SIMILAR PRO-
TECTION AGAINST INADVERTENT DAMAGE BY PERSONNEL.
26. ALL LINES WHICH PASS THROUGH THE PRESSURIZED CABIN WALL INTO THE
HABITABLE AREAS OF THE SPACECRAFT SHALL HAVE A SHUTOFF VALVE
LOCATED IN THE LINE IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT ENTERS INSIDE THE
CABIN WALL.
27. ALL LINES WHICH DUMP OR VENT EXTERNAL TO THE HABITABLE AREAS OF
THE SPACECRAFT SHALL HAVE THERMOSTATICALLY CONTROLLED HEATERS
TO PROTECT AGAINST CLOGGING.
4.3 FLEXIBLE HOSES
28. FLEXIBLE HOSES SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM SLACK ALLOWANCE OF 5% OF
THE TOTAL HOSE LENGTH.
29. ALL FLEXIBLE HOSES SHALL BE CLAMPED AND SUPPORTED TO REMAIN
CLEAR OF SHARP EDGES AND MOVING PARTS.
30. FLEXIBLE HOSES SHALL HAVE HOSE RESTRAINTS CONNECTED ACROSS THE
HOSE CONNECTIONS AND SECURED TO THE SPACECRAFT STRUCTURE.
31. FLEXIBLE HOSE RESTRAINTS SHALL BE AT LEAST 50 PERCENT STRONGER
THAN THE MAXIMUM CALCULATED IMPACT (FORCE) ON THE RESTRAINT DUE
TO AN OPEN LINE (UNDER MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE) MOVING
THROUGH THE DISTANCE OF FLEXURE OF THE RESTRAINT.
32. ALL FLEXIBLE HOSES SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED TO INDICATE THE
SYSTEM FUNCTION, CONTENT, AND MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE.
33. A PROTECTIVE COVERING SHALL BE PROVIDED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF
EACH FLEXIBLE HOSE TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE FROM ABRASION AND CHAFING.
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4.4 FITTINGS, FLANGES AND CONNECTORS
34. SYSTEM CONNECTORS SHALL BE KEYED OR SIZED SO THAT IT IS PHYS-
ICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONNECT AN INCOMPATIBLE COMMODITY OR
PRESSURE LEVEL.
35. ALL SYSTEM FITTINGS SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE
OF 4.0 TIMES THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE AT WHICH THEY WILL BE REQUIRED
TO OPERATE WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
36. ALL CONNECTORS AND FITTINGS REQUIRED TO BE DISCONNECTED DURING
FLIGHT OPERATIONS SHALL HAVE TETHERED CAPS, PLUGS, OR COVERS
TO PROTECT THE SYSTEM AGAINST CONTAMINATION OR DAMAGE WHEN
DISCONNECTED.
4.5 PRESSURE AND LIQUID VESSELS
37. ALL PRESSURE VESSELS AND RESERVOIRS SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM DESIGN
BURST PRESSURE OF 4.0 TIMES THE MAXIMUM DESIGN OPERATING PRES-
SURE UNLESS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FRACTURE
MECHANICS TECHNOLOGY AND SAFETY FACTORS SPECIFIED BY THE PRO-
CURING AGENCY AND APPROVED FOR EACH VESSEL AND APPLICATION.
38. INITIAL OPENING OF ALL PRESSURE VESSEL PRIMARY RELIEF DEVICES
SHALL BE NO HIGHER THAN 110 PERCENT OF THE MAXIMUM DESIGN
OPERATING PRESSURE OF THE VESSEL.
39. ALL PRESSURE VESSELS AND RESERVOIRS SHALL HAVE AN ISOLATION
SHUTOFF VALVE LOCATED AS THE FIRST COMPONENT DOWNSTREAM OF THE
VESSEL AND AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE VESSEL.
40. ALL PRESSURE VESSELS SHALL HAVE A VALVE TO PERMIT CONTROLLED
REDUCTION OF PRESSURE AS DESIRED.
41. ALL PRESSURE VESSELS SHALL INCORPORATE PROVISIONS FOR MONI-
TORING VESSEL PRESSURE.
42. ALL LIQUID VESSELS SHALL HAVE A LIQUID QUANTITY INDICATING
DEVICE.
43. ALL LIQUID VESSELS SHALL HAVE A DRAIN VALVE LOCATED SUCH THAT
ALL LIQUID MAY BE DRAINED FROM THE VESSEL DURING GROUND
(HORIZONTAL OR VERTICAL) OPERATIONS.
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4.5 PRESSURE AND LIQUID VESSELS (Cont.)
44. ALL PRESSURE VESSELS SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED OR LABELED TO
IDENTIFY CONTENT AND OPERATING PRESSURE.
45. ALL LIQUID VESSELS SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED OR LABELED TO
IDENTIFY COMMODITY AND CAPACITY.
4.6 PRESSURE RELIEF
46. A PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICE SHALL BE LOCATED DOWNSTREAM OF ANY
PRESSURE REGULATING DEVICE WHERE INPUT PRESSURE TO THE REGULA-
TING DEVICE CAN EXCEED THE PROOF PRESSURE OF ANY DOWNSTREAM
SYSTEM COMPONENT.
47. THE INITIAL OPENING OF SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES SHALL BE NO HIGHER
THAN 110 PERCENT OF THE UPSTREAM REGULATOR SETTING.
48. PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES AND RELIEF VENT LINES SHALL BE SIZED TO
EXCEED THE MAXIMUM FLOW CAPACITY OF THE UPSTREAM PRESSURE REGU-
LATING DEVICE UNDER FAILED OPEN CONDITIONS.
49. INITIAL OPENING OF REDUNDANT RELIEF DEVICES, WHEN USED SHALL BE
NO HIGHER THAN 125 PERCENT OF THE UPSTREAM REGULATOR SETTING.
50. REDUNDANT RELIEF DEVICES SHALL BE LOCATED IN THE SYSTEM SO AS
NOT TO RENDER THE PRIMARY RELIEF DEVICE INEFFECTIVE (E.G.,
SERIES INSTALLATION OF RELIEF VALVES).
51. A RELIEF DEVICE SHALL BE LOCATED BETWEEN ANY RESTRICTOR ORIFICE
INSTALLATION AND AN UPSTREAM PRESSURE REGULATING DEVICE, IF
FAILURE OF THE REGULATOR WOULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURE ABOVE
PROOF LEVEL.
52. ALL RELIEF PORTS AND VENT LINES SHALL BE DESIGNED (LOCATED) SO
THAT ESCAPING LIQUID OR GASES WILL NOT BE HAZARDOUS TO PERSONNEL
OR EQUIPMENT DURING FLIGHT OR GROUND OPERATIONS.
53. ALL SYSTEM RELIEF AND VENT VALVES SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED TO
INDICATE COMPONENT NUMBER AND SYSTEM FUNCTION.
54. ALL LIQUID AND GAS VENT OR RELIEF DEVICES SHALL VENT OUTSIDE THE
SPACECRAFT HABITABLE AREAS.
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4.6 PRESSURE RELIEF (Cont.)
55. ALL SEALED PANELS, CONSOLES OR SIMILAR ENCLOSURES WHICH CON-
TAIN LIQUID OR GAS SYSTEM COMPONENTS SHALL HAVE AUTOMATIC
(FAIL-SAFE) PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES.
56. INDEPENDENT (SEPARATE) LINES SHALL BE USED TO VENT OR RELIEVE
(DISCHARGE) DIFFERENT COMMODITIES WHICH COULD DEFLAGRATE OR
OTHERWISE REACT SUCH THAT ADVERSE PRESSURE, CONTAMINATION,
CORROSION OR MATERIALS DEGRADATION COULD RESULT.
4.7 VALVES, REGULATORS AND CONTROL DEVICES
57. VENT OR BLEED VALVES SHALL BE LOCATED IN THE SYSTEM WHEREVER
LIQUIDS OR PRESSURE COULD BE TRAPPED BETWEEN COMPONENTS.
58. REGULATORS USED FOR STEP REGULATION SHALL OPERATE IN THE CENTER
50 PERCENT OF THEIR TOTAL RANGE.
59. THE MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE DELIVERED BY EACH REGULATOR SHALL
NOT BE GREATER THAN 75 PERCENT OF THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE REGULA-
TION CAPABILITY OF THE REGULATOR.
60. MANUALLY OPERATED VALVES SHALL NOT BE USED TO BY-PASS PRESSURE
REGULATOR OR FLOW CONTROL DEVICES.
61. SHUTOFF VALVES SHALL NOT BE INSTALLED IN SERIES WITH RELIEF
VALVES UNLESS ANOTHER INDEPENDENTLY OPERATED POSITIVE RELIEF
DEVICE IS INSTALLED IN PARALLEL WITH THE SHUTOFF VALVE(S).
62. CHECK VALVES SHALL BE LOCATED IN PRESSURE SYSTEMS TO MINIMIZE
DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE LOSS RESULTING FROM LOSS OF SOURCE PRESSURE.
63. CHECK VALVES SHALL BE USED TO ISOLATE PARALLEL SUPPLY SYSTEMS
OR PRESSURE VESSELS WHICH CAN BE USED TO SERVICE A COMMON
DOWNSTREAM SYSTEM.
64. CHECK VALVES SHALL BE USED TO ISOLATE PARALLEL VENT LINES EACH
OF WHICH VENTS INTO A COMMON MANIFOLD.
65. LOCKING PINS OR SIMILAR DEVICES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE DESIGN
OF ALL LIQUID AND GAS SYSTEMS TO PROVIDE POSITIVE PROTECTION
AGAINST INADVERTENT OPERATION OF ALL MANUALLY OPERATED VALVES.
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4.7 VALVES, REGULATORS AND CONTROL DEVICES (Cont.)
66. ALL SYSTEM VALVES AND REGULATING DEVICES SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED
OR PLACARDED TO IDENTIFY COMPONENT NUMBER, SYSTEM FUNCTION AND
DIRECTION OF OPERATION.
67. ALL ADJUSTABLE PRESSURE CONTROL DEVICES SHALL HAVE MARKINGS TO
INDICATE THE DIRECTION OF PRESSURE INCREASE-AND DECREASE AD-
JUSTMENT (COUNTER-CLOCKWISE INCREASE AND CLOCKWISE DECREASE
ARE PREFERRED).
4.8 GAGES AND INDICATORS
68. VISUAL MONITORING CAPABILITY SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR EACH LEVEL OF
SYSTEM PRESSURE.
69. DIRECT PRESSURE READOUT GAGES SHALL NOT BE USED.
70. ALL SEALED PANELS, CONSOLES, CONDUIT OR SIMILAR ENCLOSURES
WHICH CONTAIN LIQUID OR GAS SYSTEM COMPONENTS SHALL HAVE PRES-
SURE INDICATING OR VAPOR DETECTION DEVICES TO MONITOR AND
INITIATE AN ALARM IN THE EVENT OF SYSTEM LEAKAGE.
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SECTION: 1.0 GENERAL CRITERIA
1. OPERATING RANGE AND PERFORMANCE LIMITS FOR ALL EQUIPMENT SHALL
BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN.
2. TORQUE VALUES FOR ALL THREADED FASTENERS AND FITTINGS SHALL BE
SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN.
3. ALL MECHANICAL ACTUATING DEVICES SHALL HAVE POSITIVE MECHANICAL
STOPS FOR PROTECTION AGAINST FAILURES THAT COULD ALLOW THE
DEVICE TO EXCEED ITS INTENDED LIMITS OF TRAVEL.
4. OPENINGS (SLOTTED OR OTHERWISE) IN CABINETS, COVERS AND SIMILAR
ENCLOSURES THROUGH WHICH LEVERS, SHAFTS AND SIMILAR CONTROLS
OPERATE SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH NONFLAMMABLE PROTECTIVE COVERS,
BOOTS, OR SLIDING PLATES TO PREVENT PERSONNEL INJURY OR EQUIP-
MENT DAMAGE RESULTING FROM INADVERTENT INSERTION OR ENTRY OF
FOREIGN OBJECTS.
5. MOVING PARTS SUCH AS FANS, BELT DRIVE ASSEMBLIES AND SIMILAR
COMPONENTS THAT COULD CAUSE PERSONNEL INJURY OR EQUIPMENT
DAMAGE DUE TO INADVERTENT CONTACT WITH SUCH EQUIPMENT SHALL BE
PROVIDED WITH GUARDS OR SIMILAR PROTECTIVE DEVICES.
6. LOCKING PINS, KNOBS, HANDLES, AND SIMILAR DEVICES WHICH MAY
REQUIRE TEMPORARY REMOVAL SHALL BE TETHERED OR OTHERWISE HELD
CAPTIVE TO THE EQUIPMENT WITH WHICH THEY ARE USED.
7. BEADED LINK CHAINS SHALL NOT BE USED AS TETHERS OR RESTRAINTS.
8. ALL CONTROLS AND INDICATORS SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED OR LABELED
TO INDICATE. SYSTEM FUNCTION.
9. EMERGENCY CONTROLS (ELECTRICAL OR MECHANICAL) USED FOR SHUTDOWN,
SAFING, ALARM OR CORRECTIVE ACTION SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED (E.G.,
PLACARDS, RED BOARDERS, ETC.), VISIBLE AND READILY ACCESSIBLE
TO OPERATING PERSONNEL.
10. MECHANICAL COMPONENTS OR MECHANISMS REQUIRING MANUAL OPERATION
OR ADJUSTMENT SHALL BE DESIGNED FOR OPERATION WHILE WEARING
PROTECTIVE CLOTHING SUCH AS GLOVES.
11. ALL HANDLES AND CONTROLS INCLUDING THOSE FOR MECHANISMS SUCH AS
FOLDING PLATFORMS SHALL BE DESIGNED WITH SUFFICIENT CLEARANCES
TO ADJACENT STRUCTURES OR OTHER COMPONENTS TO PREVENT INJURY
TO FINGERS AND HANDS.
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SECTION: 1.0 GENERAL CRITERIA
12. ALL HANDLES, KNOBS, LATCHES, HATCHES AND SIMILAR MECHANICAL
DEVICES THAT REQUIRE ALIGNMENT OR ADJUSTMENT SHALL HAVE ALIGN-
MENT INDICES TO ENSURE PROPER ALIGNMENT, ADJUSTMENT AND OPERA-
TION.
13. ALIGNMENT INDICES, DETENTS, RIGGING POINTS OR ALIGNMENT MARKS
SHALL BE VISIBLE FOR ALIGNMENT RECHECK WITHOUT REMOVAL OF ANY
COMPONENT.
14. SYSTEMS SHALL BE DESIGNED SO THAT IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE
TO INSTALL COMPONENTS IN REVERSE.
15. ALL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO BE LIFTED OR MOVED BY HOIST OR CRANES
SHALL HAVE LIFTING EYES OR SIMILAR PROVISIONS FOR POSITIVE
ATTACHMENT OF SLINGS, CABLE HOOKS AND SIMILAR DEVICES.
16. GROSS WEIGHT AND CENTER-OF-GRAVITY SHALL BE CONSPICUOUSLY
IDENTIFIED ON ALL EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO BE LIFTED OR MOVED BY
HOISTS, CRANES, FORKLIFTS AND SIMILAR HANDLING EQUIPMENT.
17. ATTACH POINTS FOR TIE-DOWNS SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED OR LABELED
ON ALL EQUIPMENT.
18. SKID MOUNTED EQUIPMENT SHALL HAVE THE CENTER-OF-GRAVITY LOCA-
TION AND GROSS WEIGHT CLEARLY IDENTIFIED ON EACH SIDE OF THE
EQUIPMENT.
19. SKID MOUNTED EQUIPMENT SHALL HAVE FORKLIFT INSERTS ON EACH SIDE.
20. CASTERS ON MOBILE EQUIPMENT SHALL HAVE INDEPENDENT LOCKING
DEVICES ON EACH CASTER.
21. MOBILE EQUIPMENT SHALL HAVE SELF-CONTAINED WHEEL LOCKING DEVICES.
22. ALL MOBILE OR PORTABLE EQUIPMENT SHALL HAVE STATIC GROUND PRO-
VISIONS.
23. COMPONENTS CONTAINING MERCURY SHALL NOT BE USED.
24. CLEANLINESS LEVELS AND CONTAMINATION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS SHALL
BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN.
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SECTION: 1.0 GENERAL CRITERIA
25. CLEANLINESS LEVELS AND CONTAMINATION CONTROLS FOR ALL GROUND
SUPPORT SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT WHICH EITHER DIRECTLY INTERFACE
WITH, OR MAY BE REQUIRED FOR USE WITHIN FLIGHT HARDWARE SHALL
HAVE REQUIREMENTS AT LEAST EQUAL TO THOSE OF THE FLIGHT SYSTEM,
EXPERIMENT OR OTHER PAYLOAD HARDWARE THAT THEY ARE REQUIRED TO
SUPPORT.
26. CLEANING AGENTS AND PROCESSES THAT ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE SYS-
TEM (E.G., COMPONENT MATERIALS, METAL SURFACES, COATINGS AND
COMMODITIES USED WITHIN THE SYSTEM) SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE
DESIGN.
27. ALL CONNECTORS (E.G., ELECTRICAL, HYDRAULIC, PNEUMATIC) SHALL
HAVE TETHERED CAPS, PLUGS OR COVERS TO PROTECT AGAINST CON-
TAMINATION OR DAMAGE WHEN UNMATED.
28. NONFLAMMABLE PROTECTIVE COVERS (INCLUDING GRID FLOOR COVERINGS)
SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR THE PROTECTION OF FLIGHT HARDWARE AND
PERSONNEL AGAINST FALLING OBJECTS WHILE WORKING ON, OR ADJACENT
TO, OR WITHIN THE FLIGHT MODULES WHEN MODULES ARE IN THE
VERTICAL OR HORIZONTAL POSITION.
29. GSE USED WITHIN THE SPACECRAFT SHALL NOT INCLUDE RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL.
30. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SHALL NOT BE USED FOR ILLUMINATING PURPOSES
WITHOUT POSITIVE MECHANICAL PROTECTION AGAINST ABRASION OR
FLAKING UNDER ALL POTENTIAL CONDITIONS OF USE.
31. RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS SHALL NOT BE USED FOR ANY PURPOSE UNLESS
IT CAN BE PROVEN THAT A NON-RADIOACTIVE SUBSTITUTE MATERIAL
CANNOT BE USED.
32. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL EMBODIED OR SUSPENDED BY CERAMIC MATERIAL,
PAINT OR SIMILAR COATINGS SHALL NOT RELEASE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
AT ALL INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL EXTREMES ANTICIPATED
DURING GROUND OPERATIONS.
33. ALL EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING SHIPPING CONTAINERS AND VANS, SHALL HAVE
WARNING PLACARDS TO IDENTIFY HAZARDOUS COMMODITIES AND RESTRIC-
TIONS SUCH AS "NO SMOKING", "EXPLOSIVES", ETC.
34. WARNING PLACARDS, SAFETY TAPE, COLOR CODED LABELS AND SIMILAR
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION MATERIAL SHALL BE PLACED IN A CLEARLY
VISIBLE LOCATION.
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SECTION: 1.0 GENERAL CRITERIA
35. EQUIPMENT DESIGN SHALL PRECLUDE THE GENERATION OF SOUND
PRESSURE LEVELS ABOVE 90 db.
36. ALL TEMPERATURE GAGES, PRESSURE GAGES, ELECTRICAL METERS AND
SIMILAR READOUT DEVICES SHALL BE COLOR BANDED TO INDICATE
SYSTEM OPERATING, MARGINAL AND HAZARDOUS RANGE LIMITS.
37. ALL TEMPERATURE GAGES, PRESSURE GAGES, ELECTRICAL METERS AND
SIMILAR READOUT DEVICES SHALL INDICATE NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATING
RANGE WITHIN THE CENTER 50 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL RANGE OF THE
READOUT DEVICE.
38. ALL EQUIPMENT REQUIRING ADJUSTMENT DURING OPERATION SHALL HAVE
EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENT PROVISIONS.
39. ALL EQUIPMENT SHALL AUTOMATICALLY REVERT TO A SAFE CONFIGURA-
TION WHEN AN INPUT POWER LOSS OCCURS.
40. ALL OVENS, OR SIMILAR ENVIRONMENTAL CHAMBERS INCORPORATING
HEATING ELEMENTS SHALL HAVE REDUNDANT AUTOMATIC HEATER SHUT-OFF
DEVICES (INDEPENDENT OF PRIMARY TEMPERATURE CONTROLLING DEVICES)
THAT REQUIRE MANUAL RESET.
41. DRY AIR ONLY SHALL BE USED FOR GAS PURGES, TO PRECLUDE THE RISK
OF ANOXIA ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF INERT GASES.
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SECTION: 2.0 ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC
2.1 GENERAL
1. GUIDE PINS OR SLIDES SHALL BE LOCATED ON ALL PANEL, DRAWER AND
CHASSIS SUBASSEMBLIES FOR ALIGNMENT DURING INSTALLATION AND TO
PREVENT CONTACT WITH EXPOSED TERMINALS TO THE EQUIPMENT DURING
INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL.
2. ALL ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT SHALL HAVE AN EXTERNAL
GROUNDING TERMINAL FOR CONNECTION TO FACILITY GROUND.
3. ALL CONTROL SHAFTS, KNOBS, HANDLES OR LEVERS SHALL BE GROUNDED,
INSULATED OR MADE OF NONCONDUCTIVE MATERIAL IN ORDER TO PRE-
CLUDE PERSONNEL SHOCK OR BURN.
4. ALL RACKS, CHASSIS AND COMPARTMENTS WHICH CONTAIN EXPOSED TER-
MINALS AND SIMILAR COMPONENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED OR
PLACARDED TO INDICATE THE HIGHEST OPERATING VOLTAGE POTENTIAL
PRESENT.
5. INSULATED GUIDES SHALL BE PROVIDED WHEREVER AN ADJUSTMENT TOOL
COULD CONTACT ANY ADJACENT CIRCUIT COMPONENT HAVING A VOLTAGE
POTENTIAL.
6. EQUIPMENT SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH A SINGLE MAIN POWER ON-OFF
SWITCH WHICH WILL REMOVE ALL POWER (OTHER THAN INPUT POWER TO
THE MAIN SWITCH) FROM THE EQUIPMENT WHEN THE SWITCH IS PLACED
IN THE OFF POSITION.
7. ALL EXTERNAL PARTS OF RF EQUIPMENT, EXCLUDING THE DRIVEN ELE-
MENTS OF THE ANTENNA AND TRANSMISSION LINES SHALL BE AT GROUND
POTENTIAL AT ALL TIMES.
8. RF EQUIPMENT SHALL BE SHIELDED TO PREVENT PERSONNEL EXPOSURE TO
RF LEVELS GREATER THAN 10 mw/cm2 EXCEPT IN FRONT OF THE ANTENNA.
9. CATHODE RAY TUBES SHALL BE COVERED IN FRONT WITH A SAFETY SHIELD
TO PROTECT PERSONNEL FROM TUBE IMPLOSION.
10. CONFORMAL COATINGS WHICH MAY OVERSTRESS COMPONENTS SUCH AS GLASS
DIODES SHALL NOT BE USED.
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2.1 GENERAL (Cont.)
11. ALL ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS AND CABLE INSTALLATIONS SHALL BE
DESIGNED WITH SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY, LENGTH, AND ACCESSIBILITY
TO PERMIT DISCONNECTION AND RECONNECTION WITHOUT DAMAGE TO
WIRING OR CONNNECTORS.
12. ALL CONNECTORS, CIRCUIT BOARDS, TERMINAL BOARDS, SWITCHES,
RELAYS AND SIMILAR COMPONENTS IN EQUIPMENT WHICH MAY BE USED IN
AN UNCONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT SHALL BE POTTED, SEALED, OR SIMI-
LARLY PROTECTED AGAINST LIQUID LEAKAGE OR CONDENSATION.
13. ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS WHICH HAVE NOT
BEEN MOISTURE PROOFED, SHALL NOT BE LOCATED BELOW LIQUID LINES
OR COLD SURFACES SUBJECT TO CONDENSATION.
14. POLYURETHANE CONFORMAL COATINGS CONTAINING SOLVENTS WHICH
DISSOLVE POLYSTYRENE SHALL NOT BE USED ON CIRCUIT BOARDS CON-
TAINING POLYSTYRENE COMPONENTS.
15. SOLID WIRE (SINGLE STRAND) SHALL NOT BE USED IN LOCATIONS
WHERE IT MAY BE SUBJECTED TO FLEXING.
16. GASKETS, SEALS AND SIMILAR COMPONENTS CONTAINING SULPHUR SHALL
NOT BE USED WITHIN OR IN CONTACT WITH ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
CONTAINING COPPER, ZINC, NICKEL, OR SILVER.
17. ULTRASONIC VIBRATION SHALL NOT BE SPECIFIED AS A METHOD FOR
CLEANING ELECTRONIC ASSEMBLIES.
2.2 CABLING AND WIRING
18. ALL ELECTRICAL CABLES AND WIRING SHALL BE CLAMPED AND SUPPORTED
TO REMAIN CLEAR OF SHARP EDGES AND MOVING PARTS.
19. ALL ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC WIRING SHALL BE LOCATED AND
CLAMPED TO ELIMINATE ANY POSSIBILITY OF CONTACT WITH LIQUID
LINES.
20. ALL ELECTRICAL CABLES AND WIRING SHALL BE CLAMPED AND SUPPORTED
TO ELIMINATE MECHANICAL STRESS ON WIRES, TERMINATIONS AND
CONNECTORS.
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2.2 CABLING AND WIRING (Cont.)
21. ALL ELECTRICAL CABLES AND WIRES SHALL BE MARKED TO CLEARLY
INDICATE THE CORRECT MATING CONNECTION OR TERMINATION POINT TO
PRECLUDE PHASE REVERSAL OR CROSS-CONNECTION.
22. ALL ELECTRICAL POWER CABLES SUPPLIED FOR USE WITH GSE SHALL BE
HEAVY DUTY TYPE WITH POSITIVE LOCKING DEVICES TO PREVENT INAD-
VERTENT DISCONNECTION.
23. ALL POWER CABLES SHALL HAVE AN INDEPENDENT NONCURRENT CARRYING
GROUND CONDUCTOR.
24. POWER AND SIGNAL WIRING SHALL NOT BE ROUTED THROUGH THE SAME
CABLE BUNDLE OR WIRING HARNESS TO INSURE THAT VOLTAGE WILL NOT
BE INDUCED INTO SIGNAL CIRCUITS.
25. SHIELDS USED TO PROTECT AGAINST INDUCED VOLTAGE FOR FREQUENCIES
UP TO 50 KHz SHALL BE CONTINUOUS THROUGH ALL CONNECTIONS AND
.GROUNDED AT ONLY ONE END.
26. SHIELDS USED TO PROTECT AGAINST INDUCED VOLTAGE FOR FREQUENCIES
ABOVE 50 KHz SHALL BE CONTINUOUS THROUGH ALL CONNECTIONS AND
GROUNDED AT BOTH ENDS.
27. WIRES AND CABLES SHALL NOT BE IDENTIFIED OR MARKED BY HOT
STAMPING ON THE INSULATION.
2.3 CONNECTORS
28. ALL MATING PLUGS AND RECEPTACLES SHALL BE MARKED OR CODED TO
CLEARLY INDICATE THE CORRECT MATING CONNECTION.
29. ALL ADJACENT CONNECTORS SHALL BE SHAPED OR RESTRAINED SO THAT
IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MISMATE.
30. CONNECTORS WITH UNKEYED SYMMETRICAL PIN ARRANGEMENTS SHALL NOT
BE USED.
31. ONLY FEMALE CONNECTORS SHALL BE USED AS ACCESS TO SOURCES OF
POWER.
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2.3 CONNECTORS (Cont.)
32. ALL GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT CABLES WHICH CONNECT TO PROTOTYPE
OR FLIGHT HARDWARE SHALL HAVE CONNECTORS WHICH ARE INDIVIDUALLY
SHAPED OR RESTRAINED SO THAT IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO
MISMATE OR CROSS-CONNECT EITHER END OF THE CABLE.
33. POWER CIRCUITS AND SIGNAL CIRCUITS SHALL NOT BE ROUTED THROUGH
THE SAME CONNECTOR IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE THE INTRODUCTION OF
VOLTAGE TRANSIENTS INTO SIGNAL WIRING.
34. ALL POWER RECEPTACLES AND CONNECTORS LOCATED IN OR USED WITH
EQUIPMENT CONTAINING FLAMMABLE VAPOR OR LIQUIDS SHALL BE
EXPLOSION PROOF.
2.4 BATTERIES
35. ALL WET CELL BATTERIES SHALL HAVE POSITIVE VENTING CAPABILITY
FOR EACH CELL.
36. ALL HERMETICALLY SEALED BATTERIES SHALL HAVE BLOWOUT PLUGS FOR
PRESSURE RELIEF.
37. ALL BATTERY VENT, BLOWOUT PLUGS AND RELIEF OUTLETS SHALL BE
DESIGNED SO THAT BATTERY ELECTROLYTE CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM
THE BATTERY.
38. ALL BATTERY VENTS, BLOWOUT PLUGS AND RELIEF OUTLETS SHALL BE
.LOCATED TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE TO ADJACENT EQUIPMENT OR INJURY TO
OPERATING PERSONNEL.
39. BATTERIES SHALL HAVE DECALS OR MARKERS WHICH INDICATE THE TYPE
OF ELECTROLYTE AND SPECIAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS.
2.5 CONTROL COMPONENTS
40. ALL ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS LOCATED WITHIN
CONSOLES, PANELS OR SIMILAR EQUIPMENT ENCLOSURES CONTAINING OR
EXPOSED TO FLAMMABLE VAPORS OR LIQUIDS SHALL BE EXPLOSION
PROOF.
41. ALL SWITCHES SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED OR LABELED TO INDICATE
THE SYSTEM FUNCTION FOR EACH SWITCH POSITION.
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2.5 CONTROL COMPONENTS
42. ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS OR SWITCHES USED TO CONTROL EQUIPMENT OR
CIRCUITRY INTENDED FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES SHALL HAVE POSITIVE
PROTECTION AGAINST INADVERTENT OPERATION.
43. ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS OR SWITCHES USED TO CONTROL THE ARMING OF
PYROTECHNIC DEVICES SHALL HAVE POSITIVE PROTECTION AGAINST
INADVERTENT OPERATION.
44. SELF-LATCHING FUNCTION SWITCHES SUCH AS PUSH-BUTTON SWITCH-
INDICATORS WHICH MAY BE OPERATED WITHOUT INDICATING THE SWITCH
POSITION DURING A POWER OFF PHASE SHALL NOT BE USED.
45. ALL CIRCUITS (INCLUDING LATCHING RELAY CIRCUITS) SHALL BE
PROTECTED AGAINST INADVERTENT OPERATION DUE TO VOLTAGE TRAN-
SIENTS.
46. TERMINAL LUGS AND INSULATED WASHERS USED WITH STUD-MOUNTED DIODES
SHALL HAVE SUFFICIENT MATCHING SURFACE AREA TO INSURE THAT THE
TERMINAL LUG WILL REMAIN INSULATED FROM THE MOUNTING STRUCTURE.
47. POSITIVE MECHANICAL MEANS SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN TO
INSURE ADEQUATE CONTACT PRESSURE IS MAINTAINED AT STUD-MOUNTED
DIODE CONNECTIONS.
48. POSITIVE PROVISIONS SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN TO PRECLUDE
SEEPAGE OF CONFORMAL COATINGS INTO ELECTRICAL INTERFACES IN STUD-
MOUNTED DIODE INSTALLATIONS.
2.6 CONTROL FUNCTIONS
49. REDUNDANT CONTROL CIRCUIT COMPONENTS SHALL BE INDEPENDENT OF
THOSE COMPONENTS USED IN THE PRIMARY CONTROL CIRCUIT.
50. PRIMARY AND REDUNDANT CONTROL CIRCUIT WIRING SHALL NOT BE
ROUTED THROUGH THE SAME CABLE OR CONNECTOR.
51. REDUNDANT CONTROL CIRCUITS SHALL INCLUDE A SELF-TEST OR CHECK-
OUT CAPABILITY.
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2.6 CONTROL FUNCTIONS (Cont.)
52. ALL CURRENT CARRYING CONDUCTORS (POWER, CONTROL, SIGNAL AND
RETURNS) CONNECTED TO FLIGHT HARDWARE SHALL HAVE CURRENT OVER-
LOAD DEVICES FOR PROTECTION OF THE FLIGHT HARDWARE.
53. NEGATIVE CONTROL OR SWITCHING IN THE POWER RETURN LEADS OF A
COMPONENT SHALL NOT BE USED, UNLESS THE POSITIVE LEAD IS
SWITCHED SIMULTANEOUSLY.
54. SELF-TEST CIRCUITS SHALL INDICATE THE ACTUAL SYSTEM RESPONSE,
RATHER THAN INDICATE ONLY THE INITIATION OF A COMMAND OR TEST
SIGNAL.
55. ALL SYSTEM INDICATORS USED TO MONITOR SYSTEM STATUS SHALL
INDICATE THE ACTUAL SYSTEM RESPONSE RATHER THAN INDICATE ONLY
THE INITIATION OF A COMMAND OR APPLICATION OF POWER.
56. LOSS OF CONTROL CIRCUIT POWER SHALL NOT RESULT IN POWER LOSS
TO DEVICES WHICH INDICATE RESPONSE OR CONFIGURATION STATUS OF
CONTROLLED COMPONENTS (I.E., POWER FOR INDICATORS OR INSTRU-
MENTATION USED TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION, PRESSURE LEVELS, ETC.,
SHALL BE INDEPENDENT AND ISOLATED FROM FAILURES IN CONTROL
CIRCUITS FOR THOSE VALVES OR SENSORS).
2.7 OVERLOAD PROTECTION
57. ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS LOCATED IN OR USED WITH EQUIPMENT CONTAIN-
ING FLAMMABLE VAPORS OR LIQUIDS SHALL BE EXPLOSION PROOF.
58. CIRCUIT BREAKERS SHALL PROVIDE A VISUAL INDICATION WHEN TRIPPED.
59. CIRCUIT BREAKERS SHALL TRIP AND PROTECT THE CIRCUIT EVEN IF THE
SWITCH LEVER IS PHYSICALLY HELD IN THE "ON" POSITION.
60. OVERLOAD PROTECTION DEVICES SHALL BE INSTALLED IN EACH UN-
GROUNDED CONDUCTOR IN THREE (3) PHASE POWER SYSTEMS AND SHALL
BE DESIGNED SO THAT ALL THREE (3) DEVICES TRIP SIMULTANEOUSLY.
61. ALL ADJUSTABLE TYPE CIRCUIT BREAKER SETTINGS SHALL BE SPECIFIED
IN THE DESIGN.
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2.7 OVERLOAD PROTECTION (Cont.)
62. ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS SHALL BE SIZED (OR SET) TO PROTECT THE
SMALLEST WIRE WITHIN A CIRCUIT, INCLUDING ALL BRANCHES, WHICH
DO NOT HAVE INDEPENDENT CIRCUIT PROTECTION.
63. OVERLOAD PROTECTION DEVICES SHALL BE SIZED (OR SET) SO THAT THE
COMBINATION OF CURRENT AND TIME AT WHICH THE DEVICE OPERATES
WILL NOT CAUSE THE OPERATION OF UPSTREAM PROTECTIVE DEVICES.
2.8 HAZARD DETECTION AND WARNING
64. HAZARD DETECTION AND WARNING SYSTEMS SHALL BE POWERED FROM AN
INDEPENDENT EQUIPMENT OR FACILITY POWER BUS.
65. POWER LOSS TO HAZARD DETECTION SYSTEMS SHALL RESULT IN THE
GENERATION OF AN ALARM.
66. POWER-OFF ALARMS SHALL BE ENERGIZED BY AN INDEPENDENT POWER
SOURCE.
67. HAZARD DETECTION AND WARNING CIRCUITRY SHALL INCLUDE A MASTER
ALARM RESET CAPABILITY TO PERMIT CONTINUED MONITORING FOR
ADDITIONAL OUT-OF-TOLERANCE CONDITIONS WHICH MAY OCCUR AFTER AN
INITIAL ALARM.
68. HAZARD DETECTION AND WARNING SYSTEMS SHALL INITIATE AN AUDIBLE
ALARM AND VISUAL INDICATION FOR ANY OUT-OF-TOLERANCE CONDITION.
69. HAZARD DETECTION AND WARNING SYSTEMS SHALL INCLUDE A SELF-TEST
OR CHECKOUT CAPABILITY.
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3.1 GENERAL
1. SYSTEMS SHALL BE DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF SHOCK WAVES
OR-PRESSURE SURGES GENERATED BY SUDDEN CHANGES IN FLOW.
2. ALL PRESSURE REGULATOR, FLOW CONTROL AND RELIEF DEVICE SETTINGS
SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN.
3. ALL LIQUID AND GAS SYSTEMS SHALL BE DESIGNED TO PERMIT LEAK
TESTING AT MAXIMUM DESIGN OPERATING PRESSURE AFTER INSTALLATION.
4. PROOF TEST REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL COMPONENTS SHALL BE A MINIMUM
OF 1.5 TIMES THE MAXIMUM PRESSURE AT WHICH THEY WILL BE REQUIRED
TO OPERATE WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
5. ISOLATION VALVES SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR INDEPENDENTLY CONTROL-
LING LIQUIDS, GASES AND VACUUM BEING SUPPLIED TO EACH FLIGHT
SUBSYSTEM, EXPERIMENT OR OTHER PAYLOAD DURING CHECKOUT OPERA-
TIONS.
6. ALL SEALED PANELS, CONSOLES OR SIMILAR ENCLOSURES WHICH CONTAIN
LIQUID OR GAS SYSTEM COMPONENTS SHALL HAVE AUTOMATIC (FAIL-SAFE)
PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES.
7. LINES SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR VENTING FLAMMABLE, TOXIC, ASPHYXIAT-
ING OR NOXIOUS WASTE TO THE EXTERIOR OF THE CHECKOUT ENVIRONMENT.
8. ALL VENT LINES AND RELIEF PORTS SHALL BE LOCATED SO ESCAPING
LIQUID OR GASES WILL NOT BE HAZARDOUS TO PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT.
9. LIQUID LINE INSULATION SHALL BE MADE OF NON-ABSORBENT MATERIALS.
10. ALL PIPING AND COMPONENTS WITHIN EACH SYSTEM SHALL BE ELEC-
TRICALLY CONTINUOUS OR BONDED ACROSS EACH CONNECTION (ALL PIPING
SEGMENTS) AND SHALL BE GROUNDED TO REDUCE STATIC ELECTRICAL
POTENTIAL.
11. ALL MATERIALS INCLUDING SEALS, GASKETS AND LUBRICANTS SHALL BE
COMPATIBLE WITH THE SYSTEM COMMODITY AND SHALL MEET THE CLEANliLI
NESS LEVELS AND CONTAMINATION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS OF THE
INTERFACING FLIGHT SYSTEM, EXPERIMENT OR OTHER PAYLOAD HARDWARE
FOR WHICH THE MOST STRINGENT REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED.
12. OXYGEN SYSTEMS OPERATING ABOVE 3000 PSI SHALL BE DESIGNED TO BE
OPERATED REMOTELY.
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3.1 GENERAL (Cont.)
13. TITANIUM OR ITS ALLOYS SHALL NOT BE USED IN OXYGEN SYSTEMS.
14. TITANIUM OR ITS ALLOYS SHALL NOT BE USED WITH METHANOL.
15. DISSIMILAR METALS SHALL NOT BE USED IN COOLANT SYSTEM IF A
GALVANIC CIRCUIT IS THEREBY ESTABLISHED WITH THE COOLANT ACTING
AS ELECTROLYTE.
16. ALL GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SUPPLYING LIQUIDS OR GASES TO
FLIGHT SYSTEMS SHALL HAVE A FILTER INSTALLED AS THE LAST
COMPONENT IN EACH SUPPLY LINE.
17. FILTER HOUSINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO BE REMOVED FROM THE SYSTEM
FOR ELEMENT REPLACEMENT SHALL NOT BE USED.
18. FILTERS SHALL BE INSTALLED IN PUMP AND COMPRESSOR INLET LINES
WITH PRESSURE INDICATORS ON EACH SIDE OF THE FILTER OR A
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE GAGE.
19. PUMPS AND COMPRESSORS SHALL BE PROTECTED AGAINST DAMAGE BY USE
OF PROTECTIVE DEVICES SUCH AS THERMAL OVERLOADS, BY-PASS RELIEF
DEVICES, VIBRATION SENSITIVE CUT-OUT SWITCHES, PUMP SUCTION
PRESSURE INTERLOCKS AND OVERSPEED CONTROLS.
20. PUMP AND COMPRESSOR ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS SHALL BE CLEARLY
IDENTIFIED TO PREVENT PHASE REVERSAL.
21. ELECTRICAL OR ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS SUCH AS MOTORS, SENSORS, OR
SWITCHES USED IN LIQUID OR GAS SYSTEMS SHALL BE INSTALLED WITH
THE COMPONENT HOUSING EXTERNAL TO THE VESSEL OR PIPING CONTAINING
THE LIQUID OR GAS.
3.2 LINES
22. ALL LINES AND FLEXIBLE HOSES SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM DESIGN BURST
PRESSURE OF 4.0 TIMES THE MAXIMUM DESIGN OPERATING PRESSURE AT
WHICH THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
23. ALL LINES USED IN FIXED APPLICATIONS SHALL BE FIRMLY SUPPORTED
TO PROTECT AGAINST DAMAGE FROM MECHANICAL STRESS AND VIBRATION.
24. ALL LINES USED IN FIXED APPLICATIONS SHALL BE INDEPENDENTLY
CLAMPED.
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3.2 LINES (Cont.)
25. ALL LINES (FIXED OR FLEXIBLE) SHALL BE CLAMPED AND SUPPORTED AS
CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO LINE END FITTINGS AND CONNECTORS IN ORDER
TO REDUCE MECHANICAL STRESS (INCLUDING SIDE LOADS) AND VIBRATION
AT THE CONNECTION POINT.
26. ALL RIGID LINES USED IN FIXED APPLICATIONS SHALL BE SUPPORTED
AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE AT EACH BEND IN THE LINE.
27. ALL LINES INCLUDING FLEXIBLE HOSES USED IN FIXED APPLICATIONS
SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED TO INDICATE SYSTEM FUNCTION, CONTENT,
MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE AND DIRECTION OF FLOW.
28. FLEXIBLE HOSE MATERIALS SHALL BE SELECTED FOR COMPATIBILITY WITH
THE SERVICE COMMODITY.
29. FLEXIBLE HOSES USED IN FIXED APPLICATIONS SHALL BE PROTECTED
AGAINST ABRASION, CHAFING AND EXTREME TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS.
30. FLEXIBLE HOSES SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM SLACK ALLOWANCE OF 5 PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL HOSE LENGTH FOR ALL FIXED APPLICATIONS.
31. ALL FLEXIBLE HOSES USED IN FIXED APPLICATIONS SHALL BE CLAMPED
AND SUPPORTED TO REMAIN CLEAR OF SHARP EDGES AND MOVING PARTS.
32. FLEXIBLE HOSES FOR USE IN TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS SHALL HAVE
PROVISIONS FOR ATTACHING HOSE RESTRAINTS ACROSS EACH CONNECTION.
33. FLEXIBLE HOSES USED IN FIXED (PERMANENT) INSTALLATIONS SHALL
INCORPORATE HOSE CONTAINMENT DEVICES TO RESTRAIN THE HOSE IN
CASE OF RUPTURE.
34. FLEXIBLE HOSE RESTRAINTS SHALL BE AT LEAST 50 PERCENT STRONGER
THAN THE MAXIMUM CALCULATED IMPACT (FORCE) ON THE RESTRAINT DUE
TO AN OPEN LINE (UNDER MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE) MOVING
THROUGH THE DISTANCE OF FLEXURE OF THE RESTRAINT.
35. FLEXIBLE HOSES FOR USE IN TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS SHALL HAVE
ATTACHED TAGS OR PLACARDS TO INDICATE PROOF TEST PRESSURE, DATE
OF LAST PROOF TEST AND REQUIRED RETEST INTERVALS.
36. FLEXIBLE HOSES FOR USE IN TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS SHALL BE
CLEARLY MARKED TO INDICATE THE SYSTEM FUNCTION, CONTENT, AND
MAXIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE.
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3.2 LINES (Cont.)
37. ALL FLEXIBLE HOSES SHALL HAVE ATTACHED TAGS, PLACARDS, OR
SIMILAR IDENTIFICATION PROVISIONS TO CLEARLY INDICATE THE
CORRECT MATING CONNECTION.
3.3 FITTINGS, FLANGES AND CONNECTORS
38. ADJACENT OR INCOMPATIBLE SYSTEM CONNECTORS OR FLANGED CON-
NECTIONS SHALL BE KEYED OR SIZED SO IT IS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE
TO CONNECT AN INCOMPATIBLE PRESSURE UNIT, COMMODITY OR PRESSURE
LEVEL.
39. ALL SYSTEM FITTINGS SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE
OF 4.0 TIMES THE MAXIMUM DESIGN OPERATING PRESSURE AT WHICH
THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
40. ALL FLANGED CONNECTIONS FOR FLEXIBLE HOSES TO BE USED IN
TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH BLIND FLANGES
(END PLATES) TO PROTECT AGAINST CONTAMINATION OR DAMAGE WHEN
NOT IN USE.
41. ALL METALLIC FITTINGS, SLEEVES AND CONNECTORS SHALL BE RESIS-
TANT TO STRESS CORROSION.
3.4 PRESSURE AND LIQUID VESSELS
42. ALL PRESSURE VESSELS AND RESERVOIRS SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM DESIGN
BURST PRESSURE OF 4.0 TIMES THE MAXIMUM DESIGN OPERATING PRES-
SURE AT WHICH THEY WILL BE REQUIRED TO OPERATE WITHIN THE SYSTEM.
43. INITIAL OPENINGS OF ALL PRESSURE VESSEL PRIMARY RELIEF DEVICES
SHALL BE NO HIGHER THAN 110 PERCENT OF THE MAXIMUM DESIGN
OPERATING PRESSURE OF THE VESSEL.
44. ALL PRESSURE VESSELS AND RESERVOIRS SHALL HAVE AN ISOLATION
SHUTOFF VALVE LOCATED AS THE FIRST COMPONENT DOWNSTREAM OF THE
VESSEL AND AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE VESSEL.
45. ALL PRESSURE VESSELS SHALL HAVE A VALVE TO PERMIT CONTROLLED
REDUCTION OF PRESSURE AS DESIRED.
46. ALL PRESSURE VESSELS SHALL HAVE A POSITIVE PRESSURE INDICATING
DEVICE.
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3.4 PRESSURE AND LIQUID VESSELS (Cont.)
47. ALL LIQUID VESSELS SHALL HAVE A LIQUID QUANTITY INDICATING
DEVICE.
48. ALL LIQUID VESSELS SHALL HAVE A DRAIN VALVE LOCATED AT THE
LOWEST POINT SO THAT ALL LIQUID MAY BE DRAINED FROM THE VESSEL.
49. ALL PRESSURE VESSELS SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED OR LABELED TO
IDENTIFY CONTENT AND OPERATING PRESSURE.
50. ALL LIQUID VESSELS SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED OR LABELED TO
IDENTIFY COMMODITY AND CAPACITY.
51. PORTABLE PRESSURIZATION OR PURGE SUPPLIES SHALL INCLUDE RACKS,
HOLDERS, OR CARTS TO SECURE AND PROTECT THE PRESSURE BOTTLES,
HAND VALVES AND REGULATOR ASSEMBLIES AGAINST DAMAGE.
52. ALL CRYOGENIC LIQUID VESSELS SHALL BE THERMALLY INSULATED OR
VACUUM JACKETED.
3.5 PRESSURE RELIEF
53. A PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICE SHALL BE LOCATED DOWNSTREAM OF ANY
PRESSURE REGULATING DEVICE WHERE INPUT PRESSURE TO THE REGU-
LATING DEVICE CAN EXCEED THE PROOF PRESSURE OF THE DOWNSTREAM
SYSTEM (DOWNSTREAM SYSTEM INCLUDES COMPONENTS OR FLIGHT HARD-
WARE UNDER ALL TEST OR OTHER OPERATING CONDITIONS).
54. THE INITIAL OPENING OF SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES SHALL BE NO HIGHER
THAN 110 PERCENT OF THE UPSTREAM REGULATOR SETTING.
55. PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES AND RELIEF VENT LINES SHALL BE SIZED TO
EXCEED THE MAXIMUM FLOW CAPACITY OF THE UPSTREAM PRESSURE
REGULATING DEVICE.
56. REDUNDANT POSITIVE RELIEF CAPABILITY SHALL BE PROVIDED IN ALL
GSE WHENEVER A GROUND SYSTEM PRIMARY RELIEF DEVICE MALFUNCTION
COULD ALLOW FLIGHT SYSTEM PROOF PRESSURE LEVELS TO BE EXCEEDED.
57. INITIAL OPENING OF REDUNDANT RELIEF DEVICES SHALL BE NO HIGHER
THAN 125 PERCENT OF THE UPSTREAM REGULATOR SETTING OR NO HIGHER
THAN PROOF PRESSURE LEVEL OF THE DOWNSTREAM SYSTEM OR VESSEL
UNDER TEST, WHICHEVER IS THE LESSER.
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3.5 PRESSURE RELIEF (Cont.)
58. BREDUNDANT RELIEF DEVICES SHALL BE LOCATED IN THE SYSTEM SO AS
NOT TO RENDER THE PRIMARY RELIEF DEVICE INEFFECTIVE (E.G.,
SERIES INSTALLATION OF RELIEF VALVES).
59. WHERE RELIEF VALVES AND BURST DISCS ARE USED IN COMBINATION,
RELIEF VALVES SHALL BE LOCATED UPSTREAM OF BURST DISCS.
60. A RELIEF DEVICE SHALL BE LOCATED BETWEEN ANY RESTRICTOR ORIFICE
INSTALLATION AND THE UPSTREAM PRESSURE REGULATING DEVICE, IF
FAILURE OF THE REGULATOR WOULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURE ABOVE
PROOF LEVEL.
61. ONLY NONCHATTERING RELIEF DEVICES SHALL BE USED.
62. ALL SYSTEM VENT VALVES SHALL BE DESIGNED TO FAIL OPEN.
63. ALL SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES SHALL BE DESIGNED TO FAIL OPEN.
64. ALL SYSTEM VENT VALVES SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED TO INDICATE
COMPONENT NUMBER AND SYSTEM FUNCTION.
65. ALL SYSTEM RELIEF DEVICES SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED TO INDICATE
COMPONENT NUMBER, SYSTEM FUNCTION, OPERATING PRESSURE SETTING,
LATEST TEST DATE AND RETEST INTERVAL.
3.6 VALVES, REGULATORS AND CONTROL DEVICES
66. REGULATORS USED FOR STEP REGULATION SHALL OPERATE WITHIN THE
CENTER 50 PERCENT OF THEIR TOTAL RANGE.
67. MANUALLY OPERATED VALVES SHALL NOT BE USED TO BY-PASS PRESSURE
REGULATORS OR FLOW CONTROL DEVICES.
68. PRESSURE REGULATORS SHALL HAVE INPUT AND OUTPUT GAGES LOCATED
AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE REGULATOR.
69. ONLY NONCHATTERING REGULATORS SHALL BE USED IN OXYGEN PRES-
SURIZATION SYSTEMS.
70. ALL SYSTEM VALVES AND REGULATING DEVICES SHALL BE IDENTIFIED
BY COMPONENT NUMBER, SYSTEM FUNCTION AND DIRECTION OF OPERATION.
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71. ALL ADJUSTABLE PRESSURE CONTROL DEVICES SHALL HAVE MARKINGS TO
INDICATE THE DIRECTION OF PRESSURE INCREASE AND DECREASE
ADJUSTMENT.
72. THE MAXIMUM SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE DELIVERED BY EACH REGU-
LATOR SHALL NOT BE GREATER THAN 75 PERCENT OF THE MAXIMUM
PRESSURE REGULATION CAPABILITY OF THE REGULATOR.
73. VENT OR BLEED VALVES SHALL BE LOCATED IN THE SYSTEM WHENEVER
LIQUIDS OR PRESSURE COULD BE TRAPPED BETWEEN COMPONENTS.
74. SHUTOFF VALVES SHALL NOT BE INSTALLED IN SERIES WITH RELIEF
VALVES UNLESS A BURST DISC OR OTHER POSITIVE RELIEF DEVICE IS
INSTALLED IN PARALLEL.
75. ONLY SLOW OPENING AND CLOSING VALVES WITH NONROTATING POPPETS
SHALL BE USED IN OXYGEN SYSTEMS.
76. CHECK VALVES SHALL BE LOCATED IN PRESSURE SYSTEMS TO MINIMIZE
DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE LOSS RESULTING FROM LOSS OF SOURCE PRESSURE.
77. LOCKING PINS OR SIMILAR DEVICES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE DESIGN
OF ALL LIQUID AND GAS SYSTEMS TO PROVIDE POSITIVE PROTECTION
AGAINST INADVERTENT OPERATION OF ALL MANUAL LEVER OPERATED
VALVES.
78. CHECK VALVES SHALL BE USED TO ISOLATE PARALLEL SUPPLY SYSTEMS
OR PRESSURE VESSELS WHICH CAN BE USED TO SERVICE A COMMON
DOWNSTREAM SYSTEM.
79. CHECK VALVES SHALL BE USED TO ISOLATE PARALLEL VENT LINES EACH O0
WHICH VENTS INTO A COMMON MANIFOLD.
3.7 GAGES AND INDICATORS
80. PRESSURE GAGES SHALL BE INSTALLED IN THE SYSTEM TO PROVIDE
VISUAL MONITORING CAPABILITY FOR EACH LEVEL OF SYSTEM PRESSURE.
81. ALL DIRECT PRESSURE READOUT GAGES SHALL BE EQUIPPED WITH
SHATTERPROOF GLASS.
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3.7 GAGES AND INDICATORS (Cont.)
82. ALL DIRECT PRESSURE READOUT GAGES SHALL HAVE BLOWOUT PLUGS
WHICH ARE PROPERLY SIZED TO SAFELY RELIEVE THE GAGE AT MAXI-
MUM DESIGN OPERATING PRESSURE AND FLOW CAPACITY (BASED ON THE
DIAMETER OF THE INLET TO THE GAGE) IN EVENT OF INTERNAL GAGE
FAILURE.
83. ALL PANELS OR PLATES USED TO MOUNT PRESSURE GAGES SHALL INCOR-
PORATE HOLES OF SUFFICIENT SIZE TO ELIMINATE IMPAIRMENT OF
BLOW-OUT PLUG OPERATION.
84. THE INSTALLATION OF ALL DIRECT PRESSURE READOUT GAGES INCOR-
PORATING BLOW-OUT PLUGS SHALL BE DESIGNED SO THAT THE DIRECTION
OF DISCHARGE OF THE BLOW-OUT PLUG WILL NOT RESULT IN SUBSEQUENT
DAMAGE TO ADJACENT EQUIPMENT OR INJURY TO PERSONNEL.
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SECTION: 4.0 HANDLING, TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE & PROTECTIVE EQUIPT.
4.1 GENERAL
1. HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT SHALL INCLUDE PROVISIONS
FOR PROTECTING SHOCK SENSITIVE FLIGHT EQUIPMENT FROM SHOCK OR
VIBRATION LOADS IN EXCESS OF FLIGHT LIMITS.
2. HANDLING AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT SHALL INCLUDE PROVISIONS
FOR PROTECTING SHOCK SENSITIVE GROUND EQUIPMENT WHICH DOES NOT
HAVE SHOCK MOUNTING PROVISIONS.
3. PROOF-LOAD DIAGRAMS SHALL BE INCORPORATED IN THE DESIGN OF ALL
LIFTING AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT TO INDICATE TEST POINTS AND
METHODS REQUIRED FOR PROOF TEST.
4. LOAD TEST REQUIREMENTS SHALL BE SPECIFIED IN THE DESIGN FOR
STANDS, LADDERS, HOISTS, SLINGS, AND HANDLING EQUIPMENT.
5. TENSION AND TORQUE REQUIREMENTS SHALL BE SPECIFIED FOR TIE-DOWN
DEVICES.
6. WHEN NICOPRESS SLEEVES, CLAMPS OR SIMILAR COMPRESSION TYPE
DEVICES ARE USED ON WIRE ROPE, AT LEAST TWO DEVICES SHALL BE
USED TO ATTACH EACH HOOK, LINK, LOOP EYE, ETC.
7. PROTECTIVE COVERS DESIGNED FOR THE PROTECTION OF FLIGHT AND GSE
HARDWARE SHALL BE FLAME RESISTANT.
8. SHIPPING CONTAINERS AND PROTECTIVE COVERS SHALL BE CONSPICU-
OUSLY MARKED TO IDENTIFY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS SUCH AS STEP,
NO-STEP, HOISTING POINT, LIFTING POINT, CENTER OF GRAVITY,
THIS SIDE UP, FOLD LINE, ETC.
9. SHIPPING CONTAINERS AND PROTECTIVE COVERS DESIGNED FOR THE
PROTECTION OF FLIGHT AND GSE HARDWARE SHALL DISSIPATE STATIC
ELECTRICITY.
10. TIEDOWNS SHALL HAVE POSITIVE LOCKING DEVICES.
4.2 TRANSPORTATION
11. TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT USED TO TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT SENSITIVE
TO SHOCK OR ACCELERATION SHALL INCLUDE INSTRUMENTS THAT RECORD
ACCELERATION ALONG THREE AXES WITH RESPECT TO TIME.
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4.2 TRANSPORTATION (Cont.)
12. TOWED VEHICLES SHALL HAVE PERMANENTLY ATTACHED SAFETY CHAINS
CAPABLE OF HOLDING THE VEHICLE IN EVENT OF TOWBAR OR HITCH
FAILURE.
13. HINGE TYPE TOWBARS SHALL HAVE A POSITIVE LOCKING DEVICE FOR
STOWAGE IN THE RAISED POSITION WITH A STOP TO PREVENT CONTACT
WITH THE LOAD ON THE VEHICLE.
14. TRANSPORTING DEVICES SHALL HAVE TIEDOWN PROVISIONS FOR SECURING
EQUIPMENT.
15. BRAKING AND WHEEL LOCKING DEVICE CONTROLS ON TOWED MOBILE
EQUIPMENT SHALL BE PROTECTED AGAINST INADVERTENT OPERATION.
16. ALL TRANSPORT TRUCKS AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT VANS SHALL BE
PROVIDED WITH FIRE EXTINGUISHERS.
17. ALL TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT SHALL DISPLAY A LOAD LIMIT PLACARD.
4.3 LIFTING EQUIPMENT
18. LIFTING EQUIPMENT INCLUDING INDIVIDUAL SLINGS, CABLES AND
SIMILAR DEVICES SHALL EACH HAVE A METAL TAG OR PLACARD DIS-
PLAYING THE LOAD LIMIT, PROOF LOAD, DATE OF LAST PROOF TEST
AND RETEST INTERVAL.
19. LIFTING DEVICES SHALL HAVE A POSITIVE MECHANICAL LOCKING DEVICE
TO PREVENT INADVERTENT LOWERING OF THE LOAD IN THE EVENT OF
LIFTING MECHANISM FAILURE.
20. LIFTING EQUIPMENT SHALL HAVE PERMANENT MECHANICAL STOPS TO
PRECLUDE EXCEEDING DESIGN LIMITATIONS SUCH AS BOOM ANGLE OR
TRAVERSE LIMITS WHICH COULD OVERLOAD THE BOOM OR OVERTURN A
MOBILE CRANE.
21. ADJUSTABLE LIFTING FIXTURES OR OTHER DEVICES USED WITH LIFTING
EQUIPMENT SHALL HAVE POSITIVE MECHANICAL STOPS WHICH ARE PER-
MANENTLY INSTALLED (E.G., RIVETED RATHER THAN FIXED BY SET
SCREWS) TO PREVENT INADVERTENT DISASSEMBLY WHILE BEING ADJUSTED;
THE DESIGN SHALL SPECIFY THAT INSTALLATION OF SUCH STOPS SHALL
BE MANDATORY INSPECTION POINTS.
69
SYSTEM SAFETY CHECKLIST - PART II
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND FACILITY SYSTEMS DESIGN
SECTION: 4.0 HANDLING, TRANSPORTATION, STORAGE & PROTECTIVE EQUIPT.
4.3 LIFTING EQUIPMENT (Cont.)
22. AN AUTOMATIC BRAKING OR STOP FEATURE SHALL BE INCORPORATED ON
ALL LIFTING MECHANISM CABLE DRUMS.
23. ELECTRICALLY POWERED LIFTING MECHANISMS SHALL HAVE INDEPENDENT
MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL BRAKE SYSTEMS.
24. BRAKING SYSTEMS SHALL BE CAPABLE OF BRAKING AND SAFELY HOLDING A
MINIMUM OF 150 PERCENT OF THE RATED LOAD.
25. CABLES ON LIFTING EQUIPMENT SHALL BE POSITIVELY SECURED TO THE
TAKE-UP DRUM AND SHALL HAVE A MINIMUM OF FOUR FULL WRAPPINGS
AROUND THE DRUM WHEN THE EQUIPMENT IS AT A MAXIMUM EXTENDED
POSITION.
26. SLINGS SHALL BE DESIGNED FOR A SPECIFIC OPERATION.
27. HOOKS FOR LIFTING EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING HOOKS USED ON SLINGS AND
CABLES, SHALL INCORPORATE POSITIVE SAFETY LATCHING DEVICES
ACROSS THE HOOK OPENING.
28. SLING CABLES SHALL BE OF SUFFICIENT LENGTH SO THE ANGLE FORMED
BY THE SLING CABLES AT THE POINT OF THE ATTACHMENT TO THE
LIFTING DEVICE (E.G., CRANE CABLE HOOK) WILL NOT EXCEED 450.
4.4 CRADLES, STANDS, AND SUPPORT DEVICES
29. CRADLES OR SUPPORT DEVICES SHALL CONFORM TO THE SHAPE, SIZE,
WEIGHT, AND CONTOUR OF THE LOAD TO BE TRANSPORTED.
30. LOAD BEARING SURFACES ON CRADLE AND SUPPORT DEVICES SHALL HAVE
SUFFICIENT BEARING AREA TO SUPPORT THE LOAD.
31. LOAD BEARING SURFACES ON CRADLES OR SUPPORT DEVICES SHALL HAVE
PADDING TO PROTECT THE LOAD FROM DAMAGE.
32. THE EMPTY WEIGHT OF CRADLES AND SIMILAR SUPPORT DEVICES AND
THEIR LOAD CAPACITY SHALL BE DISPLAYED ON THE DEVICE.
33. CRADLES AND SUPPORT DEVICES SHALL INCORPORATE PROVISIONS FOR
ATTACHMENT OF TIEDOWNS (E.G., CABLES, STRAPS), FOR SECURING
EQUIPMENT.
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4.4 CRADLES, STANDS, AND SUPPORT DEVICES (Cont.)
34. TIEDOWN PROVISIONS SHALL BE INCLUDED FOR SECURING CRADLES OR
SUPPORT DEVICES TO TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT.
35. CRADLES AND SUPPORT DEVICES SHALL HAVE SLING EYES OR OTHER
LIFTING PROVISIONS.
36. GUIDELINES SHALL BE LOCATED ON CRADLES TO MATCH GUIDELINES ON
SPECIAL LOADS, AND SHALL BE VISIBLE AFTER EQUIPMENT IS IN PLACE.
37. ALL HOIST POINTS SHALL BE CONSPICUOUSLY IDENTIFIED ON ALL
CRADLES.
38. ALL PLATFORMS AND SUPPORT STANDS SHALL HAVE GUARDRAILS, GATES
WITH LATCHES, AND TOE BOARDS.
39. HANDRAILS SHALL BE CONTINUOUS AT CHANGES IN LEVEL AND AT ALL
OTHER TRANSITION POINTS.
40. LADDERS USED WITH SUPPORT STANDS OR PLATFORMS SHALL HAVE
ATTACHED PINS OR OTHER LOCKING DEVICES FOR POSITIVE ATTACHMENT
TO THE STANDS OR PLATFORM.
41. ALL SUPPORT STANDS, PLATFORMS AND LADDERS SHALL DISPLAY A
PLACARD TO IDENTIFY THE LOAD CAPACITY.
42. ALL SUPPORT STANDS, LADDERS AND PLATFORMS USED WITHIN, ON OR
ADJACENT TO FLIGHT HARDWARE (INCLUDING SUCH EQUIPMENT AS CON-
TOURED PLATFORMS USED ON TANK DOMES) SHALL BE PADDED TO PROTECT
THE FLIGHT EQUIPMENT.
43. ALL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT USED FOR INTERNAL ACCESS TO, OR WITH
FLIGHT MODULES SHALL INCLUDE PROTECTION FOR MATING SURFACES,
HATCH SEALING SURFACES AND SIMILAR PENETRATIONS OR OPENINGS
ALONG THE ACCESS ROUTE.
44. PROTECTIVE COVERS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR ALL MATING SURFACES,
HATCH SEALING SURFACES AND SIMILAR ACCESS OPENINGS TO PROTECT
FLIGHT HARDWARE DURING GROUND OPERATIONS, INCLUDING THE INSTALLA-
TION OF EQUIPMENT INTO FLIGHT MODULES AND MOVEMENT ALONG INTERNAL
ACCESS ROUTES.
45. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS SHALL NOT BE USED IN THE DESIGN OF STANDS,
PLATFORMS, LADDERS, ETC.
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4.5 SHIPPING AND STORAGE CONTAINERS
46. ALL SKIDS, PALLETS AND SHIPPING CONTAINERS SHALL BE CLEARLY
MARKED OR LABELED TO IDENTIFY HOISTING POINTS.
47. ALL CONTAINERS FOR SHOCK SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT SHALL HAVE
NONRESETTING G-LOAD METERING DEVICES.
48. ALL METAL SHIPPING CONTAINERS SHALL HAVE GROUNDING PROVISIONS.
49. CENTER-OF-GRAVITY SHALL BE CONSPICUOUSLY IDENTIFIED ON ALL
SHIPPING AND STORAGE CONTAINERS.
50. SHIPPING AND STORAGE CONTAINERS FOR PYROTECHNIC DEVICES SHALL
MAINTAIN THE SAME MOISTURE TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION AND SHOCK
ENVIRONMENT AS SPECIFIED FOR THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF THE
DEVICE.
51. SHIPPING AND STORAGE CONTAINERS FOR PYROTECHNIC DEVICES SHALL
HAVE GROUNDING PROVISIONS WHICH ARE CLEARLY MARKED.
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